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THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: INCAPACITY
AND ABILITY TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND
DUTIES OF OFFICE?
LAWRENCE J. TRAUTMAN*
ABSTRACT
History provides many instances of U.S. presidential or vice presidential
incapacity. It was the death of President John F. Kennedy that prompted the 25th
Amendment to the Constitution to gain ratification in 1967, in part to establish a
method to fill the vice presidency if it became vacant.
On Saturday morning September 22, 2018, readers of The New York Times awoke
to read a page-one story about how the Deputy Attorney General, Rod J. Rosenstein
had previously advocated the secret White House recording of President Trump, “to
expose the chaos consuming the administration, and he discussed recruiting cabinet
members to invoke the 25th Amendment to remove Mr. Trump from office for being
unfit.” Given this recent controversy, it seems timely and opportune to take a fresh
look at the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, its history and purpose, how it works, and
potential application.
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Sometimes, no matter how great their dreams or magnanimous their
aspirations, they are also reined in or thwarted by their own bodies, by
family tragedy, or by their own worst tendencies. Yet in spite of these
constraints they must strive to complete the goals they have set for
themselves and the nation. Their structural restraints and impediments are
difficult enough. When exacerbated by illness, loss, or weakness, the job
frequently borders on the impossible, with the nation's course directly
altered by what happens in their personal lives.
Jeffrey A. Engle
Thomas J. Knock
Presidential Historians1

* Associate Professor of Business Law & Ethics, Prairie View A&M University.
1

See JEFFREY A. ENGEL & THOMAS J. KNOCK, WHEN LIFE STRIKES THE PRESIDENT:
SCANDAL, DEATH, AND ILLNESS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 10 (Jeffrey A. Engel & Thomas J. Knock
eds., 2017).
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I. OVERVIEW
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a
mechanism for the vice president’s assumption of the presidency when it is determined
that the president “is unable to discharge the powers and duties of office.”2 Over the
history of the United States, there have been many instances of presidential or vicepresidential incapacity. Unbeknownst to the public—and much of the governmental
leadership at the time—First Lady Edith Wilson, with the assistance of the president’s
physician and personal secretary, kept the true state of President Woodrow Wilson’s
disabling health conditions secret from the American people for seventeen months. 3
President Wilson abandoned his day-to-day duties and ill-equipped Edith largely
oversaw these duties while also serving as the sole conduit between the President and
the outside world.4 But President Wilson was not alone. It is now clear that other past
presidents have hidden their impaired physical and mental condition from the
American public.5 What would have happened if John F. Kennedy, or any of the other
presidents who have died in office, lived for a prolonged period of time while unable
to discharge the duties and responsibilities of the presidency? The assassination of
President John F. Kennedy prompted the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution to gain ratification in 1967, “in part to establish a method to fill the vice
presidency if it became vacant.”6
On Saturday morning, September 22, 2018, readers of The New York Times awoke
to read a page-one story about how the deputy attorney general, Rod J. Rosenstein,
had previously advocated the secret White House recording of President Trump, “to
expose the chaos consuming the administration, and he discussed recruiting cabinet
members to invoke the 25th Amendment to remove Mr. Trump from office for being
unfit.”7 Given this recent controversy, it seems timely and opportune to take a fresh
look at the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, its history and purpose, how it works, and
potential application.8
This Article proceeds in eight sections. First, this Article discusses the language of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, including: the Amendment’s history and purpose;
2

U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.

3

ENGEL & THOMAS, supra note 1, at 108.

4

Id. at 109.

5

See generally id.

6 Peter Baker, Talks of the 25th Amendment Underscores a Volatile Presidency, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/us/politics/trump-25thamendment.html.
7 Adam Goldman & Michael S. Schmidt, Rosenstein Raised Idea of Recording Talks with
Trump, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2018, at A1.
8 See generally Katie Benner & Maggie Haberman, White House Was Prepared to Put a
Trump Loyalist in Rosenstein’s Place, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2018, at A16; Katie Benner,
President Would Prefer Not to Fire Rosenstein, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2018, at A16; Katie
Benner, Rosenstein Still Has His Job, Trump Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2018, at A13; Andrew
Buncombe, Donald Trump and Rod Rosenstein to Meet Amid Reports Deputy Attorney General
Expects
to
Be
Fired,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
24,
2018),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/rod-rosenstein-resignationdeputy-attorney-general-resign-trump-fired-sessions-a8552751.html.
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Constitutional meaning; congressional intent and hearings; mechanics of the
Amendment; National Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment; examples of presidential incapacity; role of the presidential physician;
the President Succession Act of 1947; and the Continuity of Government Commission.
Second, this Article presents Woodrow Wilson’s prolonged and hidden inability to
discharge the powers and duties of office. Third is a review of the circumstances
surrounding President Eisenhower’s heart attack at a time when Vice President
Richard M. Nixon was experiencing ill health and taking potentially addictive
medications. Fourth, this Article looks at the presidency of John F. Kennedy and
considers his almost constant pain and heavy use of narcotics. Fifth, is a look at
Lyndon Johnson. Sixth, this Article presents an examination of Richard Nixon’s
troubled presidential tenure. Seventh, a review of Ronald Reagan’s presidency from a
health perspective and his relationship with Vice President George H.W. Bush. Eighth,
is a look at the presidency of Donald J. Trump and the numerous instances of serious
concern from those at the highest levels of government about his competency and
mental stability. And last, I conclude.
This Article makes an important contribution to our understanding of the history,
development and importance of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution by recognizing the extent to which it has been seriously discussed
recently among the highest levels of government and by conducting a scholarly
assessment of arguments being made for contemporary application.
II. THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT
Many citizens would be astonished to discover that the Constitution does
not provide adequate procedures for the exercise of the President’s powers
and duties in the event the President becomes temporarily disabled by
illness. . . . It is incredible at this stage in our history that we have not yet
provided clear procedures for determining in what manner the powers of
the President shall be exercised during a period of incapacitating illness. . .
. in this era of crisis, failure to take corrective action could have disastrous
consequences.
Kenneth B. Keating
U.S. Senator, New York
June 11, 19639
In this section, I present the language of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and
discuss: its history and purpose; congressional hearings and intent; National
Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment; set the
stage for a discussion about examples of presidential incapacity; describe the
mechanics of the Amendment; and the President Succession Act. The need for the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment arises from the ambiguity of Article II, Section I, Clause 6,
which states:
In case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said
9 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Committee on
the Judiciary United States Senate 88th Cong. First Session on S.J. Res. 28, S.J. Res. 35 and
S.J. Res. 84 Relating to the Problem of Presidential Inability, 88th Cong. 10 (1963) [hereinafter
Hearing on Presidential Inability] (statement of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating).
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Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may
by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.10
Only one reference to the issue of disability is noted among the records of the
Constitutional Convention, when delegate Mr. John Dickinson of Delaware asked on
August 27, 1787, “[W]hat is the extent of the term ‘disability’ [and] who is to be the
judge of it?”11 The August 1964 Senate Report on Presidential Inability and Vacancies
in the Office of the Vice President discloses that a review of records for the
Constitutional Convention fail to find an answer to Mr. Dickinson’s question.12 In
addition:
It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called into
question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies. In that year
President William Henry Harrison died, and Vice President John Tyler
faced the determination as to whether, under this provision of the
Constitution, he must serve as Acting President or whether he became the
President of the United States. Vice President Tyler gave answer by taking
the oath as President of the United States. . . .
This precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on seven occasions
when Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency of the United States
by virtue of the death of the incumbent President. Vice Presidents Fillmore,
Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt, Coolidge, Truman, and Lyndon
Johnson all have become President in this manner.13
Reflecting upon his experiences as Vice President to President Eisenhower,
Richard M. Nixon observed:
Simply stated, this clause does not make clear: Who decides when the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office? Just
what devolves upon the Vice President, the “powers and duties” or the
“office” itself? can the President resume office once he has given it up?
who decides if the President is well enough to resume his office, if he can
at all?14
Having gained ratification on February 10, 1967, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution states:
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
10

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.

11

S. REP. NO. 89-66 (1965).

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Hearing on Presidential Inability, supra note 9, Exhibit No. 4 (citing RICHARD M. NIXON,
SIX CRISES 178–180 (1962)).
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Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President,
the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting
President.
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties
of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive department, or of such other body as Congress
may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within
forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within
twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if
Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice
President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President;
otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office. 15
A. History and Purpose
Story lines in popular cinema often depict scenarios where circumstances render
the president incapable of discharging the powers and duties of the office. Just a few
examples include: Dave (1993) (president suffers a stroke and is impersonated by a
look-alike);16 Air Force One (1997) (presidential aircraft hijacked with president
aboard);17 Olympus Has Fallen (2013) (president kidnapped by terrorists);18 and White
15

U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.

16

DAVE (Warner Bros. 1993).

17

AIR FORCE ONE (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1997).

18

OLYMPUS HAS FALLEN (Millennium Films 2013).
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House Down (2013) (terrorists take president hostage). 19 Historian Jonathan
Zimmerman writes:
In the second season of the TV serial drama “24,” President David Palmer
declines to order a military strike against several Middle Eastern countries
after receiving a tape recording of their officials plotting with a terrorist to
build a bomb. Palmer thinks the recording is a fake, and it turns out that
he’s right.
But Palmer’s vice president and Cabinet are itching for war, and they
decide he is acting “irrationally” by holding his fire. Invoking the 25th
Amendment . . . they vote Palmer out. He is eventually returned to office,
of course, but not before the United States bombs a few places on false
pretenses.
OK, so it’s Hollywood. But it also warns us against the casual use of the
25th Amendment, which was designed to protect us against presidents who
are disabled rather than against those whom we merely dislike. 20
A detailed historical account of every occasion of U.S. presidential or vicepresidential incapacity is beyond the scope of this single law journal article. However,
many instances have happened. Writing in 1988, The Report of the Commission on
Presidential Disability and The Twenty-Fifth Amendment [hereinafter “The
Commission”] states, “Eight of the 35 men who have occupied the White House have
died in office, four of them victims of assassins. Several have had serious illnesses,
some of which at the time were hidden from those who should have been told, as well
as the public.”21 Presidents who have died in office include: William Henry Harrison
(died April 4, 1841);22 Zachary Taylor (July 9, 1850);23 Abraham Lincoln (April 15,
1865);24 James Garfield (September 19, 1881);25 William McKinley (September 14,

19

WHITE HOUSE DOWN (Columbia Pictures Corp. 2013).

Jonathan Zimmerman, Opinion, 25th Amendment Won’t Cut It to Remove Trump, S.F.
CHRON. (May 25, 2017), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/25th-Amendment-wont-cut-it-to-remove-Trump-11175040.php.
20

21 See MILLER CENTER COMMISSION NO. 4, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL
DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT (Jan. 20, 1988) [hereinafter
COMMISSION
ON
PRESIDENTIAL
DISABILITY],
https://millercenter.org/issuespolicy/governance/the-national-commission-on-presidential-disability-and-the-twenty-fifthamendment.
22

See WILLIAM A. DEGREGORIO, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF U.S. PRESIDENTS 137 (8th ed.

2013).
23

Id. at 175.

24

See GEORGE MCGOVERN, ABRAHAM LINCOLN (Henry Holt & Co., Arthur M. Schlesinger
& Sean Wilentz eds., 2009); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, TRIED BY WAR: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AS
COMMANDER IN CHIEF (2008).
25

See DEGREGORIO, supra note 22, at 293.
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1901);26 Warren G. Harding (August 2, 1923);27 Franklin Delano Roosevelt (April 12,
1945);28 and John F. Kennedy (November 22, 1963).29
B. Constitutional Meaning, Congressional Intent, and Hearings
Volumes have been written about constitutional interpretation and congressional
intent.30 While a comprehensive discussion of constitutional construction far exceeds
the scope of this Article, some basic thoughts follow.

26

Id. at 355.

27

Id. at 431.

28

See FDR Dies, HISTORY.COM (last visited Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.history.com/thisday-in-history/fdr-dies.
29

See ROBERT DALLECK, AN UNFINISHED LIFE: JOHN F. KENNEDY 1917–1963 (2003).

30

See generally Lawrence Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Rules of Recognition,
Constitutional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance, in THE RULE
OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2009); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and
Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation
and Construction, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity:
A Critique of Faint-Hearted Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006); William Baude &
Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017); Mitchell N.
Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Curtis Bradley & Trevor W.
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012);
Thomas Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009); Jacob E. Gersen
& Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573 (2008–
2009); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901 (2013); Jamal Greene, Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Profiling
Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political
Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205 (2013); Richard S. Kay,
Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
703 (2009); Jeremy Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle
Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819 (2016); John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321
(2018); Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784 (2008);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2009); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution,
62 STAN. L. REV. (2010); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory
Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of
the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011); James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the
Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2011); Adam M. Samaha,
Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606 (2008);
Suzanna Sherry, The Four Pillars of Constitutional Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 969 (2011);
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95
(2010); Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist
Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (2011); Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003); Adrian
Vermeule, Three Strategies of Interpretation, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 607 (2005); Keith E.
Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2013).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss3/7

8

2019]

THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT

381

1. The Meaning of the Constitution
Constitutional scholar Jack Balkin observes, “the principles employed in
constitutional construction are not limited to those available at the time of adoption.
New constitutional principles (e.g., structural principles) can emerge over time as
constitutional constructions of the text.”31 Professor Balkin teaches, “[d]octrine
consists of a wide variety of different principles at different levels of generality and
specificity. New constitutional constructions can be inconsistent with many prior
constructions and with a wide variety of principles of varying levels in existing
doctrine.”32 As a foundational concept:
The term “original meaning” can be confusing because we use “meaning”
to refer to at least five different things: (1) semantic content (e.g., “what is
the meaning of this word in English?”); (2) practical applications (“what
does this mean in practice”); (3) purposes or functions (“the meaning of
life”); (4) specific intentions (“I didn’t mean to hurt you,”) or (5)
associations (“what does America mean to me?”).
Thus, when we ask about the “meaning” of the Equal Protection Clause,
we could be asking: (1) What concepts the words in the clause point to; (2)
how to apply the clause; (3) the purpose or function of the clause; (4) the
specific intentions behind the clause, or (5) what the clause is associated
with in our minds or, more generally, in our culture.
Fidelity to “original meaning” in constitutional interpretation refers only to
the first of these types of meaning: the semantic content of the words in the
clause.33
Regarding the concepts of living constitutionalism and democratic legitimacy,
Professor Balkin writes, “[i]n sum, living constitutionalism is primarily a theory about
the processes of constitutional development produced by the interaction of the courts
with the political branches. It is a descriptive and normative theory of the processes of
constitutional construction.”34 In addition:
Constitutional development outside the amendment process is the work of
constitutional construction. Constitutional construction involves both the
political branches and the courts. Constitutional construction by courts, in
turn, is largely responsive to larger changes in political culture, public
opinion, and the work of the political branches. What we call “living”
constitutionalism is really the product of constitutional construction and
changes in constitutional construction over time. For this reason it is what
Robert Post and Reva Siegel call a “democratic constitutionalism” because
constitutional doctrine is responsive to the social and political
31

Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
549, 579 (2009).
32

Id.

33

Id. at 552, citing Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Illinois Pub. Law Research
Paper No. 07-24, 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
34

See Balkin, supra note 31, at 549.
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mobilizations and counter-mobilizations that promote popular ideas of the
Constitution’s values, and to the views of popularly elected national
political elites. Change occurs (1) because of changes in constitutional
culture—what ordinary citizens and legal and political elites believe the
Constitution means and who they believe has authority to make claims on
the Constitution; (2) because of changes in political institutions and
statecraft, which courts normally make sense of and legitimate; and (3)
because of changes in judicial personnel (and hence their views of the
Constitution). The later changes are due to the judicial appointments
process, which is controlled by elected officials—particularly the President
and the Senate ̶ who in turn respond to existing political pressures and
incentives.35
Legal scholar Adam R.F. Gustafson observes:
Constitutional actors derive constitutional meaning in two ways. They
discover it through interpretation, and—when interpretive meaning runs
out—they develop it through construction. The traditional tools of
interpretation—text, history, and structure—clarify some of the TwentyFifth Amendment’s linguistic ambiguities, but residual vagueness requires
the relevant political actors to construct meaning by applying underdeterminate standards to particular circumstances. 36
2. Constitutional Meaning and the Courts
So, how does the more than 240-year-old U.S. Constitution remain relevant and
applicable to dramatic changes in culture and the human condition? Professor Jack
Balkin contends that it is likely “the most important role of federal courts in the system
of constitutional construction is legitimating and rationalizing the work of the national
political process and its constitutional constructions. Federal courts are part of the
national political process, and they are players in the dominant national coalition of
their time.”37 For the courts, it “is a process of doctrinal construction that rationalizes
and supplements constitutional constructions by the political branches and responds
to changes in political and cultural values in the nation as a whole.”38 Professor Balkin
writes:
Courts engage in constitutional construction in several different ways.
First, courts rationalize new constitutional constructions by the political
branches through creating new doctrines . . . .
Second . . . federal courts cooperate with the dominant forces in national
politics by policing and disciplining those who do not share the dominant
coalition’s values . . . courts apply vague clauses and fill in gaps and
silences in the Constitution in response to long-term changes in social
35

Id. at 592.

36

See Adam R.F. Gustafson, Presidential Inability and Subjective Meaning, 27 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 459, 462 (2009).
37

See Balkin, supra note 31, at 569.

38

Id. at 569.
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attitudes that have become reflected in national politics. During the sexual
revolution, for example, the federal courts promoted liberal values by
loosening legal restraints on pornography and by protecting the right of
married couples and single persons to use contraceptives . . . .
Third, federal courts cooperate with the national political coalition by
limiting or striking down laws that reflect an older coalition’s values.
Fourth, federal courts cooperate with the national political coalition by
taking responsibility—and thus the political heat—for decisions that
members of the dominant coalition cannot agree on and that would
potentially split the coalition.
Fifth, the Supreme Court often takes direction about how to construct
doctrine from contemporaneous expressions of constitutional values by
political majorities.39
3. What About Constitutional Evil?
Professor Jack Balkin questions whether unjust and seriously bad results are
possible from his concept of living constitutionalism? Living constitutionalism,
according to Professor Balkin, “may possess sociological legitimacy—because
constitutional construction follows public opinion; and even procedural legitimacy—
because constitutional construction is democratically responsive.”40 However, he
expresses concern that living constitutionalism “may lack moral legitimacy because
constitutional constructions can be very unjust; they can oppress minority groups and
individual citizens, and undermine or even destroy democratic values.”41 We see this
result often throughout American history, as “minorities have been badly treated and
rights denied in ways that we would find completely unacceptable in a constitutional
democracy today.”42 Modernly, the concern as applied to the Trump Administration is
whether, as in the case of:
The Bush Administration’s claim—most often associated with Dick
Cheney, David Addington and John Yoo, that when the President Acts in
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, he cannot be bound by Congressional
enactments that seek to limit his powers . . . well-trained lawyers can make
truly bad legal arguments that argue for very unjust things in perfectly legal
sounding language. No one should be surprised by this fact. Today’s
lawyers make arguments defending the legality of torture and, indeed,
claiming that laws that would prevent the President from torturing people
are unconstitutional. In the past lawyers have used legal sounding
arguments to defend the legality of slavery, Jim Crow, and compulsory
sterilization.

39

Id.

40

See id. at 611.

41

Id. at 612.

42

Id.
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Elsewhere I have asserted that the Cheney/Addington/Yoo theory of
presidential power, taken to its logical conclusions, allows Presidents to
rule by decree (or indeed without decree) and is in this sense tantamount to
presidential dictatorship. Such a theory has little basis in the original
understanding of the Founding period, which feared the rise of a new
Caesar or Cromwell; it is a product of the modern era. . . . A few more
Supreme Court appointments who saw things the President’s way, and we
might be well on our way to a conception of presidential power that would
have been unimaginable only ten years before . . . courts have made many
bad and unwise decisions in our nation’s history. Nobody should
underestimate what lawyers in high places can do armed with legal
language . . . .
The question is whether the system of living constitutionalism we have
generated through years of construction is a worthy successor to the
Framers’ idea of separation of powers and checks and balances—a system
that moderates, tests and checks; and one that makes politics both possible
and accountable to prudence and reason. This is a question of both reason
and faith; of both practical knowledge and of moral commitment to
preserving just institutions and working for better ones. 43
4. Congressional Hearings and Intent
On June 11, 1963, Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary stated, “[o]n several occasions, this country has been reminded that a
dangerous constitutional flaw exists in our presidential system.”44 Over fifty-five years
ago, Senator Kefauver warned, “[a]t least three Presidents have become so seriously
ill while they were in office that for a considerable period of time they were incapable
of exercising the powers and duties of the Presidency.”45 Unfortunately, no clear
authorization exists within the Constitution providing for “the Vice President, or any
other officer, to discharge the presidential powers and duties while the President is
unable to do so himself.”46 Senator Kefauver provides us with the following historical
account:
In 1958, this subcommittee conducted an exhaustive series of hearings into
the constitutional problem of presidential inability. The three serious
illnesses of President Eisenhower were then fresh in the public’s memory,
and six proposed constitutional amendments concerning presidential
inability had been introduced in the Senate. The hearings proved that there
was a deep concern among governmental leaders and constitutional
scholars about this problem, but that there were equally deep differences of
opinion as to what should be done to remedy the problem.
43

See id. at 612.

44

Hearing on Presidential Inability, supra note 9 (statement of Estes Kefauver, Chairman
of the S. Comm. on Const. Amendments).
45

Id.

46

Id. at 1.
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Since the 1958 hearings, the various interested parties have persisted in
their efforts to work out a satisfactory constitutional solution to this
problem.47
It was the death of President John F. Kennedy that prompted the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution to gain ratification in 1967, “in part to establish a
method to fill the vice presidency if it became vacant.”48 Subsequent hearings of the
Constitutional Amendments Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary reveal:
Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the “necessary and
proper” authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the Congress the
power to legislate in this situation. The Constitution does not vest any
department or office with the power to determine inability, or to decide the
term during which the Vice President shall act, or to determine whether and
at what time the President may later regain his prerogatives upon recovery.
Thus it is difficult to argue that article I, section 8, clause 18 gives the
Congress the authority to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying out such powers. 49
Thus, the Constitutional Amendments Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary recognized in 1973:
The death of President Kennedy and the accession of President Johnson has
pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the executive when there is
no incumbent Vice President. Sixteen times the United States of America
has been without a Vice President, totaling 37 years during our history.
As has been pointed out, the Constitutional Convention in its wisdom
foresaw the need to have a qualified and able occupant of the Vice
President’s office should the President die. They did not, however, provide
the mechanics whereby a Vice Presidential vacancy could be filled. 50
It was not until ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that “the president,
when he believed he was unable to discharge the duties of his office, [became]
authorized to make a temporary transfer of his powers and duties to the vice
president.”51
C. Mechanics of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
Since the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is divided into four sections, our discussion
of how the Amendment works will proceed to look at the mechanics of each section.

47

Id.

48

Peter Baker, Talk of 25th Amendment Underscores a Volatile Presidency, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2018, at A23.
49

S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 7 (1964).

50

Id. at 9.

51

See COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, supra note 21.
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1. Section 1
Derived from Article II, Section 1, Clause 6, this section provides that in the
instance of “the removal of the President from office or of his death, resignation, or
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the Vice President shall
become President.”52 Because the conditions of “death” or “resignation” are such
straight-forward events, Section 1 has not proven problematic historically. As
described more fully later, with the death of President William Henry Harrison, and
by Vice President John Tyler who “simply took the prescribed oath and proclaimed
himself to be president, not acting president . . . . This precedent has since been
followed in seven cases and has effectively answered the early constitutional question
of whether the new occupant should be acting president or president.”53
2. Section 2
Like Section 1, this Section relates to Article II, Section 1, Clause 5, and answers
the question about what happens when there is no sitting vice president. 54 Section 2
has now been employed twice: first, when President Nixon appointed Representative
Gerald Ford to be Vice President on October 12, 1973, after the resignation of Spiro
T. Agnew;55 and, when President Ford nominated Nelson A. Rockefeller, a former
New York Governor to serve as Vice President.56 In cases where both the president
and vice president are no longer living, the Presidential Succession Act of 1947
provides a schematic for succession.57
3. Section 3
The Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
[hereinafter “The Commission”] states, “Section 3 creates a simple and relatively
straightforward way for the president to provide for situations in which he suffers from
a temporary inability to carry out the duties of office.”58 Mechanically, this procedure
requires “the president determining that he will be temporarily unable to perform his
duties, communicating this decision to the Speaker of the House and the president pro
tempore of the Senate, and subsequently communicating that his inability has
ended.”59 Furthermore, in those instances “where the president knows in advance that
he will enter into a period of inability, this mechanism permits a smooth transition of
power under the president’s ultimate control.”60
52

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.

53

See COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, supra note 21.

54

U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.

55

See Joel K. Goldstein, Note, Adequacy of Current Succession Law in Light of the
Constitution and Policy Consideration: Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in
Enduring Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 970 (2010).
56

Id.

57

3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1), (b) (2012).

58

See COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, supra note 21.

59

Id.

60

Id.
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The Commission's report states the belief “that any president receiving anesthesia
should use Section 3 . . . that this mechanism should be made part of a routine course
of action so that its invocation carries no implications of instability or crisis . . . use
rather than non-use will create the sense of routine.”61 As discussed more fully later,
President Reagan referenced Section 3 on July 13, 1985, when he signed a letter stating
that he was “mindful of the provisions of Section 3.”62 Logic for the use of Section 3
is presented by The Commission as follows:
One situation involves elective surgery where general anesthesia, narcotics,
or other drugs that alter cerebral function will be used. A similar case
involves a debilitating disease or physical malfunction. Because anyone
under anesthesia is unable to function both during the period of
unconsciousness and afterwards while disoriented, presidents should
accept the inevitability of temporarily transferring power to the vice
president beyond the immediate hours in the operating room, or even in the
hospital—perhaps 24 or 48 hours. It would be wise for a president to state
this publicly so that the nation and the world are reassured, and to settle
White House officials’ fears of losing power.
In short, let the president wave from his window to show he is up and
around but convalescing while the vice president, as acting president under
Section 3, takes care of the day-to-day business. As Herbert Brownell has
noted, there is a substantial difference between the president being able to
wave to the crowd from a hospital window and being able to govern. 63
4. Section 4
Many of the most controversial and difficult contingency scenarios of presidential
succession are addressed in Section 4, clearly the most complicated section of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. As legal scholar Adam R.F. Gustafson writes, “Section 4
is only available when the President is so severely impaired that he is unable to make
or communicate a rational decision to step down temporarily of his own accord . . . .
Congress and the executive branch should clarify the distinct circumstances in which
applications of each section are appropriate.”64 Some congressional opponents to the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment appear concerned about the possibility of a coup d’état
because of too much power being transferred to the vice president and cabinet. 65 In
addition:
The legislative record reveals that only severe disabilities—whether
physical, mental, or as a result of capture—that render the President totally
unable to communicate a rational decision comprised the expected
applications of Section 4.
61

Id.

62

Id.; see also infra Section VI.
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See COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, supra note 21.

64

See Gustafson, supra note 36, at 462.
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Id. at 463 n.15 (2009) (expressing reservations from Rep. Henry B. González who stated
that ‘a President might be wrongfully or mistakenly removed from office . . . .’”).
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Members of Congress restricted Section 4 to severe cases of inability, with
increasing rigor and specificity leading up to the Amendment’s adoption.
On the day that S.J. Res. 1 passed the Senate and before it went to
conference, Senator Bayh provided the following strict, if somewhat
circular, definition of inability: “[T]he word ‘inability’ and the word
‘unable as used in [Section 4] . . . mean that [the President] is unable either
to make or communicate his decisions as to his own competency to execute
the powers and duties of his office.” This definition came as a
“clarification” of Senator Bayh’s earlier, more expansive statement that
“the intention of this legislation is to deal with any type of inability, whether
it is from traveling from one nation to another, a breakdown of
communications, capture by the enemy, or anything that is imaginable.”
The earlier statement is true of Sections 3 and 4 considered together but
misleading as applied to Section 4 alone. Senator Bayh’s subsequent
definition was suggested to him off the record by Senator Robert Kennedy,
whose support Senator Bayh saw as critical for the Amendment’s success.
The definition suggests, as previously argued from constitutional structure,
that Section 4 is available only where the application of Section 3 is
impossible. . . .
One week before Congress passed the recommended Amendment in its
final form, Senator Kennedy engaged Senator Bayh in a colloquy in which
the latter agreed that the inability phrase in Section 4 means “total disability
to perform the powers and duties of office. . . .” Members of Congress voted
for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment with the understanding that Section 4
applied only to states of total inability in which the President would be
unable to step down of his own volition. 66
Interpretation of Section 4 presents several unique challenges. Writing about the
broader topic of original meaning and constitutional construction, Professor Jack
Balkin observes:
Because constitutional construction occurs in the same political space and
time as the amendment process, the two processes can sometimes substitute
for each other. Vague clauses can be built out through doctrine and
institution building in ways that might also be achieved through
amendment. (the same is also true with various silences and gaps in the
original Constitution.) This is not a bug in our constitutional system; it is a
feature. Nevertheless, the process of amendment and construction are not
identical, and what each can achieve in practice does not always overlap.
Some kinds of changes—like the abolition of the Electoral College or
altering the length of the President’s term of office—cannot easily be
achieved through construction; they require amendment. Constructions
may be less durable than amendments: inter-branch understandings can be
altered through practice, statutes can be repealed and doctrinal
constructions overturned, distinguished, or made irrelevant. Conversely,
66

Id. at 482.
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amendment may be an awkward and cumbersome way to respond to certain
problems, revise previous doctrinal constructions, create new rules or
promote wholesale changes in government. Constructing doctrine
gradually through case law development and creating framework statutes
and new institutions may be a more nimble and effective method.
Today people generally associate “living constitutionalism” with judicial
decisions; but the political branches actually produce most living
constitutionalism. Most of what courts do in constitutional development
responds to these political constitutional constructions . . . .67
Commenting specifically about Section 4 interpretative issues, Professor Bryan H.
Wildenthal writes:
The ratified text of Section 4, Clause 2 of the 25th Amendment . . . refers
to “the principal officers of the executive department”—an obvious
typographical or “scrivener’s” error, one of only two in the Constitution
(the other is in Art. I, § 10, cl. 2). Clause 1 refers to “the principal officers
of the executive departments,” an obvious reference to the secretaries of the
various cabinet departments which was clearly intended and understood to
be repeated verbatim in the second clause.
It is not entirely clear what “the executive department” in Clause 2 could
refer to, even if the phrase were not, as it is, the obvious product of a simple
mistake. Presumably, it could be read to refer to the executive branch as a
whole, the “principal officers” of which might be the very same department
secretaries referred to in Clause 1, thus rendering the error harmless. Some
might argue that Clause 2 may properly be read as if corrected to remove
the error in any event, though it is unclear how a justiciable case to resolve
the point could ever be brought to the Supreme Court. 68
5. Inability Duration Considerations
Adam R.F. Gustafson concludes “that the framers generally expected Section 3 to
apply most often to short-term disabilities, especially medical operations, while
Section 4, on the other hand, generally contemplates longer periods of presidential
inability.”69 Believing that short term inabilities should rarely invoke Section 4 rather
than Section 3, Senator Bayh states:
A President who was unconscious for 30 minutes when missiles were flying
toward this country might only be disabled temporarily, but it would be of
severe consequence when viewed in the light of the problems facing the
country.
So at that time, even for that short duration, someone would have to make
a decision. But a disability which has persisted for only a short time would
67

See Balkin, supra note 31, at 560.
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See Bryan H. Wildenthal, U.S. Constitution (Thomas Jefferson School of Law Research
Paper No. 3188256, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3188256.
69

See Gustafson, supra note 36, at 484.
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ordinarily be excluded. If a President were unable to make an Executive
decision which might have severe consequences for the country, I think we
would be better off under the conditions of the amendment.70
6. What About Criminal or Impeachment Proceedings?
Taking place during the lifetime of many readers, the scandals surrounding
Presidents Nixon and Clinton, scholars have suggested Sections 3 and 4 of the TwentyFifth Amendment as a potential mechanism whereby “an embattled President could
temporarily step aside during impeachment proceedings.”71 However, in both the case
of Presidents Nixon and Clinton, “both situations resolved without even a rumor that
the Vice President or cabinet considered declaring presidential inability under Section
4.”72 However, as Adam R.F. Gustafson writes:
As Watergate evidence piled up against President Nixon and Vice President
Agnew, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford suggested that public
loss of confidence in Nixon rendered the executive branch ineffectual.
After Agnew resigned and Vice President Ford had been confirmed, White
House insiders prepared for Nixon to invoke Section 3 and temporarily
relinquish power to Ford during the investigation. John Feerick, a lawyer
instrumental in drafting the Amendment, notes that Section 3 “offered
[Nixon] an opportunity to step aside temporarily during an impeachment
inquiry. In fact, several members of Congress . . . suggested that he consider
standing aside under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment on the ground that he
was unable to discharge the duties of his office because of the constitutional
controversies attending Watergate.” Nixon called this a “fatuous
suggestion” and apparently never seriously considered invoking Section 3.
During another presidential scandal, Akhil Amar suggested that invoking
Section 3 during his impeachment trial would have offered President
Clinton “recovery of his honor and a shot at redemption.” Although neither
President accepted the invitation, these events revealed a consensus that
Section 3 is broad enough to allow a President to cede power and dedicate
himself to his own defense in an impeachment proceeding, or even to
concede that the loss of his popular mandate rendered him ineffectual. Such
a use would conform to the President’s broad, unreviewable discretion
under Section 3 . . . .
[Since] Impeachment does not render a President totally unable to govern,
as President Clinton demonstrated after he was impeached, so Section 4 has
no application where an impeached President rationally decides to remain
in office while defending against conviction. 73
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Id. at 485.
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Id. at 491.
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D. National Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
Approximately twenty years after ratification, the two principal authors of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, former Eisenhower Attorney General Herbert Brownell
and former U.S. Senator from Indiana Birch Bayh agreed to serve as co-chairmen of
the University of Virginia’s fourth Miller Center Commission.74 A prominent group
of individuals participated in The Commission on Presidential Disability and the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment [hereinafter “The Commission”] representing important
national U.S. organizations such as: the League of Women Voters, the American Bar
Association, and the American Medical Association. 75
The Commission concluded that it was preferable, “rather than amend the
Constitution in an attempt to deal with such scenarios of presidential disability,
political reality requires that the people of this nation make the most of what the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment encompasses.”76 The Commission further recognized that
the complexities of life may create “extremely complicated circumstances and could
prove more difficult to implement.”77 The Commission attempted to define some of
these scenarios and recommended creation of “a guide intended to assure prompt
application in a manner faithful both to the spirit of the Constitution and to the intent
of the framers of this Amendment.”78
During the more than twenty years that had passed since ratification, The
Commission noted several occasions where Sections 1 and 2 of the Amendment had
“come into play with no resulting problems.”79 Accordingly, The Commission focused
its report on Sections 3 and 4 and is, “designed to apply to complicated factual
situations and are dependent to a great extent upon the circumstances which exist at
the time of implementation.”80 These issues, recommendations and subsequent
amendments to the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 are discussed in greater detail
later in this Article.81
E. Examples of Presidential Incapacity
The human species is fragile and subject to invisible mental and physical health
threats from many sources: bacteria, viruses, injuries from various sources, and
genetic predisposition. The stresses of public office also tend to age many presidents
faster than they might otherwise.82 I have chosen the stories of several occupants of
the White House during the past century to illustrate how vulnerable the American
democracy is to human frailty. Non-historians may be alarmed to learn how often
occupants of the White House have chosen to mislead the American public about the
74

See COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, supra note 21.
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health of the American president, a topic that seems to receive scant coverage (much
like tax returns) during presidential elections.
In so many aspects of society, lawmakers and thoughtful employers have
recognized that public safety demands the rigor of health examinations, and often drug
usage tests, for such occupations as: a precondition to serve in any branch of the armed
forces; airline pilots; operators of railroad engines; and professional athletes. 83 It defies
logic to contemplate that the same information is not required of candidates seeking
top elected office. Historians have contributed thousands of books and articles about
various U.S. presidents and vice presidents. 84
The various personal tragedies experienced by us all also impact presidential
wellbeing and performance. The loss of family members has weighed heavily on many
presidents: Andrew Jackson, death of his spouse Rachel;85 Franklin Pierce, witnessing
the violent death of his son just weeks before taking office; 86 and Calvin Coolidge’s
loss of his sixteen-year-old son.87 Abraham Lincoln suffered from depression, death
of a son, and added pressure of dealing with a mentally unbalanced wife. 88
Two examples of the temporary inability provisions of Section 3 presidential
incapacity are seen within recent years in uses where a president must undergo minor
surgeries requiring anesthesia. On July 29, 2002 President George W. Bush took
advantage of this provision for a total of “two hours and fifteen minutes during and
after a twenty-minute colorectal screening.”89 By fax to the Congressional leadership,
President Bush invoked Section 3 using two separate letters—one serving to initiate
the period of inability90 and the second to terminate it.91 Next, transfer of presidential
power was made to Vice President Cheney by President George W. Bush on July 21,
2007, “for two hours and five minutes while having benign polyps removed from his

83

See generally 2 Employment Screening Drug & Alcohol § 12.01 (2018).

84 See, e.g., Stefanie Cohen, Fourscore and 16,000 Books, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2012),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444024204578044403434070838.

See Daniel Feller, A Crisis of His Own Contrivance: Andrew Jackson’s Break with John
C. Calhoun, in WHEN LIFE STRIKES THE PRESIDENT: SCANDAL, DEATH, AND ILLNESS IN THE
WHITE HOUSE 13 (Jeffrey A. Engel & Thomas J. Knock eds., 2017).
85

86 See Michael F. Holt, Personal Loss and Franklin Pierce’s Presidency, in WHEN LIFE
STRIKES THE PRESIDENT: SCANDAL, DEATH, AND ILLNESS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 65 (Jeffrey A.
Engel & Thomas J. Knock eds., 2017).
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See Michael Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln and the Death of His Son Willie, in WHEN
LIFE STRIKES THE PRESIDENT: SCANDAL, DEATH, AND ILLNESS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 10 (Jeffrey
A. Engel & Thomas J. Knock eds., 2017).
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See Gustafson, supra note 36, at 459, citing Mike Allen, Bush Resumes Power After
Test—President’s Routine Colon Exam Showed No Abnormalities, WASH. POST, June 30, 2002,
at A13.
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See Gustafson, supra note 36, at 488, citing Letter from President George W. Bush to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1 Pub. Papers 1083 (June 29, 2002).
91 See Gustafson, supra note 36, at 488, citing Letter from President George W. Bush to
President Pro Tempore of the Senate 1 Pub. Papers 1083 (June 29, 2002).
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large intestine. The surgery itself lasted just thirty-one minutes.”92 Again, two letters
were employed, one to initiate, another to end the period of power transfer. 93
A full treatment of presidential health and incapacity far exceeds the scope of this
Article. However, for perspective, a brief discussion of some of the facts we now know
about health risks that have previously had impact upon the function of government
during the following presidencies is presented: Woodrow Wilson; Dwight
Eisenhower; John F. Kennedy; Lyndon Johnson; Richard Nixon; Ronald Reagan; and
George W. Bush. Standing alone, this brief treatment for each seems sufficient to
establish the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s critical importance.
F. Role of Presidential Physician
The Commission recognized the necessity for, “greater public recognition that
presidents, like the rest of us, are subject to periodic illnesses and disabilities and that
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment . . . offers excellent standard operating procedures for
times of temporary presidential disability, a simple method to get through such
contingencies without government disruption or public alarm.”94 A copy of The
Commission’s statement about the importance of the role of the president’s physician
is included as Appendix B to this Article. In addition:
The Commission has been impressed by what it has learned of the advances
and complexities of modern medicine, in part from our discussions with
two former presidential physicians who cared for five presidents. It is now
obvious that the presidential physician can, and must, play an increased
role. We view it as a dual role: first, the physician must uphold his role in
the traditional, confidential doctor-patient relationship; second, and equally
important in the uniquely presidential case, the physician must act as a
representative, in strictly non-political terms, of the interests of the nation
which elected the president.95
G. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, as Amended
On July 18, 1947, President Harry Truman signed the Presidential Succession Act
which provided a new schematic for presidential succession in the event of death or
incapacity of both the president and vice president. 96 The provision for presidential
line of succession has differed over the years, and the 1947 Act replaced provisions
from 1886, which in turn had replaced the original act of 1792. 97 While significant
turnover has taken place among cabinet members during the first two years of the

92 See Gustafson, supra note 36, at 489, citing Deb Riechmann, 5 Polyps Removed from
Bush’s Colon, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 21, 2007).
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UNITED STATES SENATE, SENATE STORIES: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION ACT,
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visited March 5, 2019).
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Trump Administration, Exhibit 1 depicts the presidential order of succession as of the
beginning of 2019, as follows:98
Exhibit 1
Presidential Order of Succession
As of January 3, 2019

H. Continuity of Government Commission
Following the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September
11, 2001, many concerns were raised about ensuring future governmental continuity. 99
Funded privately by the Carnegie, Hewlett, Packard, and MacArthur Foundations, The
Continuity of Government Commission was founded in the fall of 2002 by the
American Enterprise Institute and Brookings “to consider how each of our three
branches of government might reconstitute themselves after a catastrophic attack on
Washington, D.C. and to make recommendations for statutory and constitutional
changes that would improve the continuity of our basic institutions.”100 The Continuity
of Government Commission issued two reports. The first of these, issued in June 2003,
provided a plan for temporary appointments to the U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives until special elections could be held in the event of attacks resulting
See Jason Silverstein, Here’s the Presidential Order of Succession—Just in Case, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (May 17, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/presidential-ordersuccession-case-article-1.2973129#.
98
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mass incapacitations or vacancies.101 The second report, issued by The Continuity of
Government Commission on July 2, 2009:
[A]ddresses our system of Presidential succession and how we would
replace a president after a catastrophic terrorist attack to ensure the proper
functioning of our government. Unlike the current provisions for
congressional continuity which do not include any institutional protections
in the case of an attack causing mass vacancies or mass incapacitations,
there is a Presidential succession system in place. However, it is the finding
of this commission that the current system would be inadequate in the face
of a catastrophic attack that would kill or incapacitate multiple individuals
in the line of succession . . . .
The current constitutional and legal provisions fail to take into account the
possibility of a catastrophic attack on Washington, D.C. Since all
individuals included in the Presidential line of succession are based in our
nation’s capital, a catastrophic attack on the city could potentially kill or
incapacitate many if not all of those individuals and cause significant
confusion about who can assume the powers of the presidency. With the
inclusion of members of Congress and acting cabinet secretaries in the line
of succession, all of whom must resign from their current positions before
assuming the presidency and then can be “bumped” from the presidency by
an individual ranking higher in the line of succession, it is possible to have
no one remaining in the line of succession. Current procedures leave our
nation especially vulnerable at presidential inaugurations and State of the
Union Addresses.102
The Continuity of Government Commission recommended the following changes
in the order of succession for the presidency:
1. Vice President
2. Secretary of State
3. Attorney General
4. Followed by four or five newly appointed individuals residing outside of
Washington, D.C.103
Within five months of situations developing where both the presidency and vice
presidency became vacant during the first twenty-four months of a presidential term,
The Continuity of Government Commission recommended that a special election
should be held.104 The removal of Congressional leaders and cabinet secretaries is also
recommended in the belief that their succession may be unconstitutional and that such
a change may help to limit confusion as to exactly who can assume power. 105 In
addition to numerous other suggestions, the Continuity of Government Commission
101
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also recommends that incoming presidential nominees be appointed prior to the
inauguration to ensure individuals will remain in the line of succession. 106
III. WOODROW WILSON
[Edith Wilson was dedicated to] protecting [her] husband's health and
political fortunes. Sometimes this has led to hiding presidential illnesses,
the most obvious 20th century case being that of Edith Bolling Wilson
during her husband's final years of semi-invalidism in the White House
after suffering successive strokes. The presidential physician colluded with
Mrs. Wilson to hide the truth from almost everyone.
The National Commission on
Presidential Disability and the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment
January 20, 1988107
While almost a century ago, the presidency of Woodrow Wilson provides a vivid
example of how, unbeknownst to the public and much of the governmental leadership
at the time, disabling health conditions has rendered objectively vacant the office of
the presidency, with day-to-day duties abandoned or overseen largely by an illequipped spouse.108 Thomas Woodrow Wilson served as President of the United States
from 1913 until the election of 1920 when Warren G. Harding won the presidency.109
Historian Thomas J. Knock writes:
Woodrow Wilson . . . occupies a secure position within the exclusive
pantheon of great presidents. The domestic legislation that he signed into
law and the new directions he chartered in foreign policy during World War
I shaped the politics and diplomacy of the United States throughout the
twentieth century and beyond. . . . It included the creation of the Federal
Reserve System and the Federal Trade Commission, tariff reform . . . and
to restrict child labor . . . .
Yet few presidents, after accomplishing so much, experienced a reversal of
fortunes as tragic as the one that happened to Wilson in his second term. 110
A brief account follows detailing some of President Wilson’s frequent and
progressive illnesses. These accounts vividly illustrate risks to the American public
from presidential incapacity.
Historian H.W. Brands states that “in 1896 he [Wilson] suffered a cerebral
incident, probably a minor stroke, that cost him the use of his right hand
106
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temporarily . . . . In 1906 another apparent stroke, again minor, prompted a long
holiday in Bermuda.”111 Also during 1906, “his hypertension burst a blood vessel in
his left eye, rendering him briefly blind, and permanently visually impaired, on that
side. In 1908 he again lost the use of his right hand, again temporarily.”112 Professor
Brands continues:
As president, he took care to pace himself, to get sufficient rest and
exercise, and for several years his hypertension appeared to be under
control. But his efforts at the peace conference and in the fight for the
league exacted a price. In April 1919 he experienced another cerebral
incident. His doctor, Cary Grayson, denied that it was a stroke, telling
Lloyd George and others that the president had simply caught the flu that
was going around (the world) and that this exacerbated a long-standing
nervous condition that produced a twitching of the face. Yet a neurologist
summoned to examine the president concluded that the patient had suffered
a “stroke so destructive as that it had made of him a changeling with a very
different personality and a markedly lessened ability.” Others noticed the
change as well. Ike Hoover, a veteran White House usher, said the president
“was never the same” after the attack.113
A. Seventeen Months of Deception
Then, in July 1919, President Woodrow Wilson “experienced another incident,
probably a small stroke. And beginning in late September . . . he suffered an attack
that culminated in a major and incapacitating stroke.”114 At this point in time:
Wilson was, in fact, experiencing a mental decline, which was discernible
to others. On several occasions in late July and early August, he responded
to queries about the Treaty with incorrect information—instances of recent
actions and events that he could not recall. His once photographic memory
began to blur. On August 8, 1919, he delivered to a joint session of
Congress a dull address full of run-on sentences about the high cost of
living.115
Professor Thomas J. Knock observes of Woodrow Wilson, “The stroke that he
suffered in October 1919 engendered a political crisis without precedent—the first,
and arguably the worst, instance of presidential disability in U.S. history.”116 Historian
Knock continues, “[t]his was not only an illness literally of constitutional magnitude;
it also occurred at a crucial moment in world history when the Great War had come to
an end and ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and American membership in the
League of Nations hung in the balance.”117 Historian Richard Striner tells the story of
111
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how Wilson’s “behavior was erratic, and the man who kept trying to emphasize selfcontrol began to snap at his colleagues and subordinates.”118 In addition:
Wilson had been diagnosed with arteriosclerosis as early as 1906. His first
wife, Ellen, had lamented the fact that hardening of the arteries . . . is an
awful thing—a dying by inches, and incurable. There is reason to suspect
that this condition was impacting Wilson’s judgment well before the stroke
that he suffered in October 1919. In light of the many strange things that he
would say and do in the course of the war, one cannot avoid wondering
how much of the tragedy was grounded in pathologies of blood circulation
and brain physiology . . . as we behold the misjudgments of Wilson—the
avoidance and fantasy and arrogance—we are torn between anger at this
man who was capable of so much better at his best and lamentation in
regard to ways in which his condition was perhaps not fully his fault. 119
Historian Brands states, “[b]ut on October 2 he collapsed on the floor of the
bathroom, where Edith found him, bloody and unconscious . . . but when he regained
consciousness . . . [he] discovered that his left side was paralyzed . . . [from] another
stroke, this far more serious and debilitating than any of the previous ones.”120 And
now we get to a resulting summary of President Wilson’s impaired physical and
mental condition, “[p]lacing personal loyalty above public interest, Grayson [Wilson’s
personal physician] and Tumulty [attorney and Wilson’s private secretary] issued a
series of statements from the president's office that ascribed to nervous exhaustion and
neurasthenia his failure to appear in public and otherwise perform his duties . . . .”121
Bottom line; “[f]or seventeen months [wife] Edith, Grayson, and Tumulty kept the
true state of Wilson's condition secret from the American people, and during most of
that period Edith served as the sole conduit between the president and the rest of the
world.”122
As to wife Edith Wilson’s stewardship during President Wilson’s illnesses and
lack of capacity, A. Scott Berg observes:
Edith would admit two decades later . . . [while President Woodrow Wilson
had diminished capacity] she would determine not only what matters
should come before the President but also when. More than a mere sentry,
the second Mrs. Wilson took it upon herself to filter and analyze every issue
that required Presidential action, executing those duties to the best of her
ability. As she explained: “I studied every paper, sent from the different
Secretaries or Senators, and tried to digest and present in tabloid form the
things that, despite my vigilance, had to go to the President.” In insisting
that she never “made a single decision regarding the disposition of public
affairs,” Mrs. Wilson failed to acknowledge the commanding nature of her
role, that in determining the daily agenda and formulating arguments
118 See RICHARD STRINER, WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD WAR I: A BURDEN TOO GREAT
TO BEAR 100 (2014).
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thereon, she executed the physical and most of the mental duties of the
office.123
Historical accounts of President Wilson’s diminished physical and mental capacity
is widely documented in numerous biographical publications, including “one White
House visitor reported that Wilson remained ‘a very sick man’—with a drooping jaw,
vacant eyes, and a fixed scowl.”124 Historian Henry Wilkinson Bragdon states,
“Wilson’s behavior during this period of tension again suggests that he may have been
suffering from an early mild attack of the cerebral arterial sclerosis that laid him low
at the height of his fight for ratification of the League of Nations in 1919.”125
The following passage seems very helpful in an attempt to better understand
President Wilson’s condition:
Based on the information they gathered for their psychological autopsy,
William Bullitt and Sigmund Freud would later present an even bleaker
picture. They pinpointed the breakdown [of Wilson] outside Pueblo,
Colorado, as the virtual death of Thomas Woodrow Wilson, because from
that moment forward, he was “no longer an independent human being but
a carefully coddled invalid.” He was at the mercy of unpredictable, often
illogical synapses, a neurological system gone haywire. “The Woodrow
Wilson who lived on,” they determined, “was a pathetic invalid, a
querulous old man full of rage and tears, hatred and self-pity.”126
Despite that the facts surrounding Woodrow Wilson’s illnesses and lack of mental
and physical capacity, particularly during late 1919, take place approximately a
century ago, the alarming issue remains that the presidency, the very top of the United
States government was materially absent for many months. As biographer Berg writes:
And so began the greatest conspiracy that had ever engulfed the White
House. With only virtuous intent, the plot unfolded—one that was hardly a
scrupulous interpretation of the Constitution, which provided for “the Case
of removal, Death, Resignation or Inability” of the President with the
ascension of the Vice President “until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected.” The devoted wife, the dedicated physician,
and—soon—the devout secretary debated among themselves how to
proceed, even though the legal issue ought not have been theirs to decide.
But the Constitution provided neither means nor measures to determine
Presidential disability, so they took the law of the land into their own hands,
concluding what best served Woodrow Wilson best served the country.
Their behavior tacitly acknowledged that this was a power grab, as they
enshrouded the Presidency in as much secrecy as possible. 127
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IV. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER AND RICHARD M. NIXON
We must not gamble with the constitutional legitimacy of our Nation’s
executive branch. When a President or a Vice President of the United States
assumes his office, the entire nation and the world must know without a
doubt that he does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment
can supply the necessary air of legitimacy.
Report of the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary
August 13, 1964128
For many years, the lives of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard M. Nixon were
deeply intertwined. Biographer Irwin F. Gellman observes of President Eisenhower’s
1955 heart attack, “[d]uring his recovery that fall and winter, Nixon assumed added
responsibilities. Already overworked, he grew weary and suffered from insomnia;
physicians prescribed barbiturates to relieve his symptoms. No one knew how
incapacitated both the president and vice president were during that period.”129
A. Eisenhower Heart Attack
Experiencing chest pain at 2:30 a.m. on Saturday, September 24, 1955, President
Eisenhower was diagnosed “with acute coronary thrombosis” and given morphine to
induce sleep.130 Following an electrocardiogram, doctors confirmed Eisenhower
suffered from a heart attack and the President was taken to Fitzsimons Army Hospital
in Colorado.131 Soon thereafter, Ann C. Whitman, personal secretary to President
Eisenhower, started the process to determine the legal implications created by the
president’s heart attack. Reportedly:
She had talked to acting attorney general William Rogers . . . asking him to
look into those issues. [Press Secretary James] Hagerty then talked to
[Chief of Staff] Jerry Persons about the implications of long-term
presidential disability. How would they handle the signing of official
documents and the delegation of powers? Hagerty had no answers. They
agreed that they should ask Rogers to examine the issues. Ten years later,
in the wake of President Kennedy’s assassination, the nation would pass
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution to address the problem of
presidential incapacity; but in 1955 there was only a vague provision in
Article II that in the past had provided little guidance. 132
A full four months later in January 1956, President Eisenhower traveled to the
Naval Base in Key West, Florida, an environment more conducive to his recovery than
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his home in Gettysburg.133 Biographer Gellman remarks of this time that Eisenhower
“rested a minimum of half an hour before lunch, and afterwards, relaxed an hour in an
easy chair. Every hour during an extended gathering, he needed to leave the room for
ten minutes and be alone to rest.”134 Richard Nixon provides the following reflection
about this experience:
Anyone, I think, can imagine 2 dozen troublesome contingencies which
might become involved in passing the powers of a President to a Vice
President, and constitutional lawyers, who have studied the question for
more than a hundred years, can think of 200 more. President Eisenhower,
after studying the problem closely, was intent on solving the practical
problem of giving his Vice President the authority to act immediately in a
crisis, if necessary. He mentioned several alternatives, but kept coming
back to the idea of writing a letter which would give the Vice President
alone the authority to decide when the President was unable to carry on—
that is, when the President himself was unable to make the decision.
In early February, the President called Rogers and me into his office,
commented that he thought he had licked the problem, and handed each of
us a copy of a letter. Then he leaned back in his chair and, while we
followed on our copies, he read a four-page letter to us, beginning, “Dear
Dick.” We made some minor suggestions and he incorporated them into the
letter and then sent it to his secretary, Ann Whitman, for final typing.
Marked “Personal and Secret,” one copy went to me, one to Bill Rogers as
Attorney General, and one to John Foster Dulles, as Secretary of State and
ranking member of the Cabinet . . . .
This letter established historical precedent. Eisenhower was the first
President in American history to take cognizance of and act upon a serious
gap in our Constitution. President Kennedy, even before his inauguration,
drew up an identical list of procedures for his Vice President, Lyndon
Johnson, to follow in exercising the rights and duties of the President in the
event of Kennedy’s incapacity. The new administration adopted in its
entirety the section of the Eisenhower letter which was made public . . . .
But what must be clearly understood is that the agreement President
Eisenhower set forth in his letter to me, and the one President Kennedy has
entered into with Vice President Johnson, are only as good as the will of
the parties to keep them. Presidents and Vice Presidents have not always
had the mutual trust and the cordial relations President Eisenhower had
with me or that President Kennedy has had with Vice President Johnson up
to this time. Jealousies and rivalries can develop within an administration
which could completely destroy such an agreement.
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Only a constitutional amendment can solve the problem on a permanent
basis.135
Irwin Gellman writes, “[t]he president’s heart attack tested how well his
administration responded to such an unexpected and devastating event . . . . It also
was fortunate that no pressing domestic or international crises erupted.”136 The
experience of President Eisenhower’s three illnesses caused Attorneys General
William P. Rogers and Herbert Brownell to propose language to achieve “a method
for determining the commencement and termination of a President’s inability, and
would not require further action by Congress.”137
B. Richard M. Nixon
Beginning in January 1952, Vice President Richard Nixon reportedly saw
physician Arnold Hutschnecker on numerous occasions. 138 Given the constant
pressure of political campaigns and stress of public office, Nixon is reported to often
complain of “a tired feeling and tension.”139 Of importance to our inquiry, then Vice
President Nixon’s physician during spring 1956:
[H]ad prescribed several medications to relieve the vice president’s tension
and insomnia. Nixon was taking three Equanil, a tranquilizer, during the
day and considering reducing that amount. He also took Dexamyl, a
stimulant that could elevate mood and lead to psychic dependence . . . .
During the evening, he had two or three drinks, which made him “feel
good.” Before going to sleep, he had half a Doriden, a potentially addictive
drug for those who had trouble sleeping, and if he awoke during the night,
he took another half . . . .
During the 1950s, this was the standard of care. All of these drugs were
popular and regularly prescribed. Doriden, in higher dosages, was a
hypnotic; Equanil was possibly habit forming and discontinued in the
1960s; Seconal was discouraged except for short periods. These drugs were
often called “downers.” Dexamyl was a potentially addicting “upper.”
Sleeping pills did not have time-released components and usually lasted for
four hours; if you awoke, it was customary to take another one to get you
back to sleep . . . .
According to Dr. Nikitas Zervanos, who practiced medicine during the
1950s, Nixon was one of many patients who, at least temporarily, “probably
abused mood altering medications and needed them for purposes of
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keeping him stimulated (uppers) or at other times to sedate (downers)
him.”140
Other examples of serious health concerns are attributed to Richard Nixon. In Six
Crises, his first memoir, Nixon describes the time period before reelection nomination
as being “‘thrown into another period of agonizing indecision, which more than any
overt crisis takes a heavy toll mentally, physically, and emotionally’ [and] while that
description might sound exaggerated, it was in fact an understatement.”141 Again, like
many other politicians at that time and throughout history, Nixon “tried to keep health
concerns hidden from media scrutiny.”142 During the first six months of 1956 alone,
Nixon is reported to have secretly consulted at least ten different physicians, keeping
“his flu, tension, insomnia, and other health problems secret, along with the drugs he
was taking to relieve his symptoms. He was able to conceal these problems because
he was not required to report them to the public.”143 And here is why, once again, the
health of both the president and vice president has implications for the future of the
planet. While President Eisenhower’s heart attack and recovery was well known at the
time, Nixon’s failure of candor regarding his health “means that at the height of the
Cold war, both the president and the vice president could easily have been
simultaneously incapacitated, leaving no one responsible for governing. Those health
conditions were never known at the time and, fortunately for the nation, their potential
consequences were never tested.”144 Concern about Richard Nixon’s mental health and
reaction to stress while serving as President is treated separately, later in this Article. 145
V. JOHN F. KENNEDY
The office’s unremitting responsibilities accompany the president wherever
he goes. In these times, a president is never away from means of instant
communication with any department of the United States government and
with almost any foreign government. Always within reach is the “football,”
containing secret codes that enable the president to signal this country’s
immediate response if ever it should face a nuclear attack. Even while
asleep, a president is always on call, and his aides will rightfully be
criticized if, upon learning of a major calamity or an alarming threat to the
nation, they do not inform the president immediately.
The National Commission on
Presidential Disability and the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment January
20, 1988146
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Historian Robert Dallek provides a detailed account of how President Jack
Kennedy was far sicker than understood at the time. 147 A war hero while in the Navy,
young Kennedy had many health problems: back injury resulting in almost constant
pain;148 gastro-intestinal disease;149early duodenal ulcer;150 trouble digesting food;151
irritable colon;152 Addison’s disease;153 arthritis;154 malaria;155 and Crohn’s disease.156
Numerous hospitalizations were required over many years. 157
A. Pain and Narcotics
According to Robert Dallek, “Kennedy knew he could not afford to show any signs
of . . . any indication of physical or psychological fatigue[.] Thus, in response to the
reporters question about his health, he declared himself in ‘excellent’ shape and
dismissed rumors of Addison’s disease as false.”158 Dallek also documents a long list
of medications taken by Kennedy at various times of his life, including:
amphetamines;159 codeine sulfate;160 desoxycorticosterone acetate;161 Ritalin;162
steroids;163 and testosterone;164 just to name a few. From his time in the Navy, back
injuries had required “large doses of narcotics.”165
The health of any one human being is always very fragile and can turn in a
heartbeat. The extent to which the fate of the world can depend on the judgment of a
single human being, and his or her ability to reason, is captured by historian Dallek in
the following passage discussing the Cuban missile crisis:
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The public had only a limited understanding of how resolute Kennedy had
been. Health problems continued to dog him during the crisis. He took his
usual doses of antispasmodics to control his colitis; antibiotics for a flareup
of his urinary tract problem and a bout of sinusitis; and increased amounts
of hydrocortisone and testosterone as well as salt tablets to control his
Addison’s disease and increase his energy. Judging from the tape
recordings of conversations made during the crisis, the medications were
no impediment to long days and lucid thought; to the contrary, Kennedy
would have been significantly less effective without them and might not
even have been able to function. But the medicines were only one element
in helping him focus on the crisis . . . .
On November 2, he took 10 additional milligrams of hydrocortisone and
10 grains of salt to boost him before giving a brief report to the American
people on the dismantling of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. In December,
Jackie asked the president’s gastroenterologist, Dr. Russell Boles, to
eliminate antihistamines for food allergies. She described them as having a
“depressing action” on the president and asked Boles to prescribe
something that would ensure “mood elevation without irritation to the
gastrointestinal tract.” Boles prescribed 1 milligram twice a day of
Stelazine, an antipsychotic that was also used as an anti-anxiety
medication. When Kennedy showed marked improvement in two days,
they removed the Stelazine from his daily medications. 166
VI. LYNDON JOHNSON
Americans demand much from their presidents. They practically require
them to be superhuman in all circumstances—cool in moments of stress,
compassionate amidst tragedy, resolute in time of war. Yet they are also
human. Presidents bleed, grieve, and err like any other citizen . . . .
Jeffrey A. Engle
Thomas J. Knock
Presidential Historians167
Abruptly catapulted into the presidency upon the assignation of John F. Kennedy,
much has been written about Lyndon Johnson. 168 As he assumed office, the weight of
the very unpopular war in Vietnam had resulted in street protests having become an
almost daily occurrence.169 Since childhood, Lyndon Johnson had suffered from
insecurities and feeling unloved resulting from his treatment by a demanding
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mother.170 Historian Randall Woods documents that Lyndon Johnson suffered from
fits of depression and that he would “withdraw, sometimes for days on end . . . . There
were intimations of a split personality.”171 In addition:
Charles Marsh, the media mogul and oilman, who was Johnson’s sponsor
and cuckold, thought LBJ was bipolar. Marsh knew from experience,
having himself been treated several times for manic depression. LBJ’s
physician, J. Willis Hurst, later speculated on the possibility that the
president suffered from a bipolar disorder: “Extremely interesting people
do display many emotions, ranging from anger, to humor to
unpredictability, to all kinds of things; up to a point this of course is entirely
normal. . . .” His thin skin, his inability to satisfy his expectations of
himself, led to subpar health. Not only was there the near-fatal 1955 heart
attack but no fewer than six cases of pneumonia, recurrent kidney stones,
and two hernia operations.172
For any president and those working on crisis situations, physical exhaustion is a
common result. For example, Joseph A. Califano served as Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare and as President Johnson’s top White House domestic policy
aide.173 Califano describes that a meeting about the war in Vietnam on February 27,
1968:
[W]as the most depressing three hours in my years of public service. My
job left me on the periphery of the war. This was the first time since early
1966 that I had heard the President's advisors in an intimate discussion of
Vietnam. McNamara, Katzenbach, and Bundy were beyond pessimism.
They sounded a chorus of despair. Rusk appeared exhausted and worn
down.174
Secretary Califano describes the health of Lyndon Johnson in another situation
months later by writing, “[t]he President was slumped in his chair and he looked very
tired. He said he knew he was tired because of his eyes. ‘They hurt and they always
hurt when I'm very tired.’”175 Medical doctors Hyman L. Muslin and Thomas H. Jobe
provide a psychologically focused account of Lyndon Johnson in their 1991 book,
Lyndon Johnson, The Tragic Self: A Psychohistorical Portrait, when they write about
his multidimensional personality:
To be comprehensive, this list of Johnson’s myriad personalities must
include immobilization by ineptitude and fear of failure; chronic fears of
the “enemy”—usually Bobby Kennedy—or the “intellectuals” who might
170
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find a soft spot in him to attack; his incapacity to share his emotional
neediness with anyone, coupled with the need to maintain a vigilant posture
of the grandiose self toward his surround. There is the inability to “selfcalm,” to subdue his agitation, manifest in the constant activity, usually
described as his enormous energy; the painful and feared states of
emptiness and loneliness; the lack of self-worth, coupled with his insistence
on always being the victor, holding center stage, and thereby the admiration
of others; his sycophancy evident from adolescence, toward sources of
power; the absence of a fixed constellation of values, which permitted him
to ally himself with various and sometimes opposing groups and sources of
power without experiencing shame or guilt (Caro, 1983; Kearns, 1976;
Johnson, 1969; Evans & Novak, 1966; Goldman, 1969; Mooney, 1973;
Steinberg, 1968).176
Doctors Hyman L. Muslin and Thomas H. Jobe also point to the period in Lyndon
Johnson’s life when he “lost the race to become the Democratic candidate for president
to Jack Kennedy in 1960, he accepted the vice-presidential slot . . . with the loss of the
power . . . as Majority Leader in the Senate, Johnson became deflated and looked and
acted clinically depressed (Kearns 1976).”177 Historian Mark Updegrove observes:
One wonders if the melancholy that [Bill] Moyers and others observed in
Johnson was due to another factor entirely. Johnson’s extreme sensitivity,
irascibility, portents of bleakness, titanic mood swings, even his monthly
fluctuations in weight—all were hallmarks of depression, however mild. .
. . Depression may also explain both Johnson’s often erratic behavior and,
given the enormity of the burdens he carried in the presidency—almost as
formidable as those carried by Lincoln, particularly in Johnson’s last years
in office . . . .178
Lyndon Johnson had another health issue that is reported to have weighed heavily
on his thinking, as he stated in 1964 while considering a run for the presidency, “‘[t]he
men in my family die early,’’ . . . memories of his near-fatal heart attack in 1955 were
there to remind him of his fragile hold on whatever life he had left.”179
Doctors Muslin and Jobe document the opinion of George Reedy, a top aide to
President Johnson and others:
A further aspect of his hostile leadership was his difficulty—in reality, his
inability—to apologize when one of his commands or positions was found
to be inaccurate or invalid. No one ever heard Lyndon Johnson admit being
wrong or inept. Even after having been proved wrong, he could not endure
being in error and the consequent loss of self-worth (Sam Houston Johnson,
1969). The domination he exerted over his dominion—from the ties his
male aides wore, to the amount of lipstick his wife used, to the papers left
176 See HYMAN L. MUSLIN & THOMAS H. JOBE, LYNDON JOHNSON, THE TRAGIC SELF: A
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on desks . . . . In Johnson’s family, however, all the members—aides, wife,
children—worked for him. Johnson was on everyone’s case, constantly
hounding, constantly exhorting his army to work harder, even though he
paid them relatively little . . . .
As a human being, he was a miserable person—a bully, sadist, lout, and
egotist. He had no sense of loyalty (despite his protestations that it was the
quality he valued above all others) and he enjoyed tormenting those who
had done the most for him. He seemed to take a special delight in
humiliating those who had cast in their lot with him. It may well be that this
was the result of a form of self-loathing in which he concluded that there
had to be something wrong with anyone who would associate with him.180
In sum, following his 1955 heart attack, Lyndon Johnson’s health seems to be
something he worried about even before assuming the presidency. Professor Randall
Woods writes, “despite his bipolar tendencies—his uncontrollable outbursts and
overreaction that were so apparent . . . the president’s judgment was not on the whole
impaired by mental illness. The Texan, though extremely intelligent, was intellectually
limited, and those limitations led at times to his intense frustration.”181 Professor
Woods states:
In assessing Lyndon Johnson’s performance in the light of the recurrent
crises of his mental health, it is important to note that the issue may also be
overshadowed by questions regarding his physical well-being. His decision
to announce, on March 31, 1968, that he would neither seek nor accept his
party’s nomination for another term as president stemmed in part from his
perception that he had expended all of his political capital; that further
domestic reform was impossible, given the urban violence and white
backlash that gripped the nation; and that removing himself from the
national politics might lead to a more reasonable public discourse on the
war in Vietnam. But his abdication was prompted as well by his personal
physician’s dire warning that he would most certainly not live to see the
end of another term. Johnson’s 1955 heart attack had nearly killed him, and
heart failure would cause his demise in 1972. Indeed, so sure that the
stresses of the job would kill her husband, Lady Bird purchased a black
dress for the funeral in the fall of 1967. The counterfactual question most
often asked about presidents of the Cold War era is what might have
happened if Kennedy had lived? But an equally intriguing question is what
if LBJ had been healthy enough to keep Richard Nixon out of the Oval
Office?182
VII. RICHARD NIXON
His depression deepened in the coming months and recurred more
frequently as circumstances at home and abroad worsened. Even a decisive
reelection in November 1972 could not stop the pain. Nixon felt himself
180
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sinking. As he punched at those whom he feared were pushing him under
the water, he only gave them more ammunition to hasten his drowning.
Depression bred hatred and illegality, which made the most powerful man
in the world a sobbing wreck, forced from the office he had struggled so
hard to attain.
Jeremi Suri
Historian183
A discussion regarding Richard Nixon’s tenure as Vice President to President
Dwight D. Eisenhower is presented previously. 184 Presented here is a brief description
of concerns about President Nixon’s mental health during his presidency. In sum,
historian and Professor Jeremi Suri describes Richard Nixon as “a troubled, insecure,
and brooding man who often expected the worst and acted in ways that brought on
those dreaded consequences. The political scandal known as Watergate, which
ultimately eroded his presidency, was a result of Nixon’s depression and so were other
distortions of domestic and foreign policy.”185 Because of Vietnam, President Nixon
inherited an unpopular war; “Nixon entered the White House with a fragile ego and
acute sensitivity to the insults he had long endured from leading figures in American
society.”186 In addition:
The weight of these challenges and Nixon’s isolation from the public,
partially self-imposed, contributed to the president’s evident bouts of
depression. Nixon functioned reasonably well in most public settings, but
descended into self-pity, paranoia, and vengeance during private meetings
and personal musings. His fears of his enemies multiplied, his sense of
victimhood deepened, and his premonitions of failure grew. 187
The impact of long-term stress and crisis seems to have an impact on physical and
mental health. As historian Jeremi Suri writes:
The emotional toll on Nixon was evident to all who worked with him. He
could not sleep. He was preoccupied. He displayed the dark and depressive
elements of his personality that often appeared in moments of greatest
stress. . . . His chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, commented in his diary that
Nixon was dejected, tired, and terribly in need of rest. The president’s
national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, expressed similar sentiments,
registering “deep concern” about Nixon’s attitude and his health. Secretary
of State William Rogers agreed with Kissinger, which was rare. Rogers and
Kissinger both believed that Nixon needed relief from the extreme
pressures of the office. 188
183 See Jeremi Suri, A Depressed and Self-Destructive President: Richard Nixon in the White
House, in WHEN LIFE STRIKES THE PRESIDENT: SCANDAL, DEATH, AND ILLNESS IN THE WHITE
HOUSE 234, 251 (Jeffrey A. Engel & Thomas J. Knock eds., 2017).
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Very early on the morning of May 9, 1970, after what is reportedly only two hours
of sleep, President Nixon made a visit to the Lincoln Memorial to talk with protesters
presumably to persuade them to the wisdom of Nixon’s views about prosecuting the
war in Vietnam.189 Of this day Professor Suri writes, “Nixon was in a psychologically
unstable state, as most people around him recognized, and his erratic behavior (as well
as his later efforts to disguise it) grew out of that personal condition.”190 In addition:
The most persuasive explanation for the events at the Lincoln Memorial
and Nixon’s subsequent impulsive and self-destructive acts is that he
suffered from intermittent but acute bouts of depression. When he felt
helpless, as he did in early May 1970 (and in many other moments before
and after) Nixon became convinced that the world was out to get him, with
powerful forces committed to his failure. Even as president, he often
perceived himself as a victim, as an outsider (from Whittier, California)
suffering from unfair treatment by powerful insiders (Ivy League
graduates, Jews, Kennedys, and Rockefellers). Nixon felt failure was
almost unavoidable, he expressed self-pity, he lost sleep, and he pushed
people away, including family and his wife, Pat. 191
So, to what extent should the American public be concerned about a president
undergoing a personal mental health crisis? Can citizens depend on Congressional
oversight to protect them in the event of presidential mental incapacity? What about
when the Congress is of the same political party? Looking again at the case of Richard
Nixon through the eyes of an historian, his “demands often had serious consequences,
especially when they involved his targeting of real and perceived enemies. The wiretappings, break-ins, and cover-ups that began in Nixon’s first months in office in 1969,
were facilitated by Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Kissinger, and others.”192 Nixon’s secret
recordings of his oval office and telephone conversations started in February 1971 and
lasted until July 1973. Jeremi Suri writes:
On the tapes he frequently becomes unhinged, issuing rambling tirades
about critics and self-justifying soliloquies about his “toughness,” his
“will,” and his “balls.” Nixon reportedly seeks validation from his advisors,
but he never gets enough. The more they praise him, the more of it he
demands. His efforts to gain validation only reinforce his feelings of
inferiority and his lonely isolation.
The tapes recount more than just stray salacious comments that Nixon’s
defenders want to dismiss. The tapes show a powerful man paralyzed by a
self-defeating personality. The pattern of rhetoric and rant is one of a man
who is filled with hate and self-doubt, and scared of hostile forces.193
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VIII. RONALD REAGAN AND GEORGE H.W. BUSH
What happens when life strikes the President of the United States and,
specifically, how personal crises—in the form of illness, the loss of a loved
one, and scandal—have throughout American history shaped presidential
decision making in critical moments, at times altering the course of events
and the fate of the nation.
Jeffrey A. Engle
Thomas J. Knock
Presidential Historians194
A. Assassination Attempt on Reagan
On Monday March 30, 1981, John W. Hinkley, Jr., who suffered from mental
illness, shot President Ronald Reagan outside the Washington Hilton Hotel.195
Hinckley had wounded four individuals with his .22-caliber pistol and President
Reagan was taken to George Washington University hospital. 196 President Reagan’s
physician, Dr. Daniel Ruge, “was in the entourage that rushed Reagan to the
hospital.”197 Dr. Ruge had the following statement when asked by The Commission
about whether use of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was considered at the time of
crisis:
It was discussed. There is a big difference between Dan Ruge on March 30,
1981, after a shooting when he’d only been on the job two months for one
thing, and what Dan Ruge would have been like four years later [at the time
of Reagan’s colon cancer operation] when he would have actually had time
from April 1981 to July 1985 to think about it. I think very honestly in
1981, because of the speed of everything and the fact that we had a very
sick president, that the 25th Amendment would never have entered my
mind even though I probably had it in my little black bag. I carried it with
me. The 25th Amendment never occurred to me.
Q: You think it would have occurred to you if the shooting had happened
four years later?
Dr. Ruge: Yes.198
Vice President George Herbert Walker Bush had just left Fort Worth Texas and
was on his way to Austin when, according to historian Jon Meacham, Vice President
Bush was handed a decoded telex informing him:
The president was struck in the back and is in serious condition . . . .
Medical authorities are deciding now whether or not to operate.
Recommend you return to D.C. at the earliest possible moment . . . . The
194
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scope of what was happening was clearer, and more frightening . . . . From
the hospital, Meese told Bush that Jerry Parr’s decision to go straight to the
emergency room had probably saved Reagan’s life. The president was still
in surgery. News of his condition and prognosis—presuming he survived—
was several hours away . . . . The White House counsel, Fred Fielding, was
at work on the mechanics of invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in the
event Reagan remained unconscious for a long period. “They’re preparing
papers for the transfer of authority if that becomes necessary,” Bush told
his staff aboard Air Force Two.199
B. Reagan’s Surgery
On July 16, 1985, The New York Times reported that President Ronald Reagan
underwent surgery to remove two feet of intestine around a polyp. 200 The Commission
reports three just days earlier, on July 13, 1985:
Reagan signed a letter in which he specifically stated that he was “mindful
of the provisions of Section 3.” However, he did “not believe that the
drafters of this Amendment intended its application to situations such as
the instant one.” He went on to say, “[n]evertheless, consistent with my
long-standing arrangement with Vice President George Bush, and not
intending to set a precedent binding anyone privileged to hold this Office
in the future,” he was passing to the vice president his “powers and
duties . . . commencing with the administration of anesthesia to me in this
instance.”201
It further appears that in the case of Ronald Reagan’s 1985 surgery, that no
decision to apply Section 3 had been made up until the last minute.202 The Commission
reports that council to the president, Fred Fielding testified:
Let’s go back to the week before the operation. We knew—some of us
knew—and I forget when it became public, that the President was going to
have his physical. We knew at the time that he was going to have a form of
anesthesia, to have the procedure that occurred on Friday, if I recall my
dates correctly. He was operated on Saturday, got a procedure on Friday.
What was going to happen was that there was a possibility that if something
was found that they would have to instantly put the President under. I used
that as an opportunity the preceding week to schedule a meeting with the
President and the Vice President and Don Regan (then chief of staff). We
sat in the Oval Office and we discussed the whole situation: the National
Command Authority plus the President’s desires on passage of power
temporarily if he were suddenly temporarily incapacitated . . . .
The decision was obvious that unless something unexpected occurred on
Friday there would be no need for the 25th Amendment in any way, shape
199
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or form. But Don Regan called me down late afternoon on that Friday and
said, “We’ve got some problems with the health exam.” And we went
through the whole drill—if you will—of what is to be done and where is
the Vice President, and what is the press to be advised of and what is not to
be told, and the normal procedures that you go through. One of the subjects
obviously was the 25th Amendment. I can tell you, and I think it is
important for the sake of history, that when we left, no decision of a
recommendation to the President had been made although we knew the
procedures. I drafted basically two letters: one was a little flushing out of
the letter that was already in the book, and the other was basically the letter
that the President actually signed.203
Professor Richard Reeves observes, “[e]xcept for the President’s thirty-minute
State of the Union message . . . Reagan was barely visible in early 1987.”204 Reagan’s
absence from public view for almost six months results from his recovery from minor
prostate surgery at Bethesda Naval Hospital, and also happens to correspond with the
timing of the first official report about the Iran-Contra controversy.205 Then, on June
28, 1987 a front page story runs in The New York Times under the headline, “Reagan’s
Ability to Lead Nation at a Low, Critics and Friends Say,” reporting that “Reagan
seemed depressed, particularly by polls indicating the public no longer believed what
he was telling them, and that he no longer trusted his own staff after reading and
watching the revelations of Iran-contra.”206 In addition:
Aides said that the President did not bounce back, as the White House has
publicly asserted, from his most recent surgery, on the prostate gland last
January. And more than ever he is showing signs of his 76 years, so much
so that his memory lapses and rambling discourse are no longer a source of
friendly jokes, but one of concern, friends say . . . . Public signs are
emerging. At a recent news conference, for instance, the President was
unable to remember the name of the United Nations Security Council. 207
Professor Richard Reeves reports in his book published in 2005 that, as of that
date, “[m]ore than nine hundred books have been written about Ronald Reagan since
he left the White House.”208 During the time following publication of the Reeves
biography no doubt additional titles are now available. However, I believe sufficient
discussion appears above to describe President Reagan’s delicate health.
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C. Health of George H.W. Bush
George Herbert Walker Bush, forty-first president of the United States, served
from January 20, 1989 until January 20, 1993.209 Generally in good health for a man
of age sixty-six, on May 4, 1991 President Bush complained of fatigue while and after
running.210 An EKG revealed a heartbeat irregularity or fibrillation.211 As historian Jon
Meacham writes:
His doctors told him that they might have to put him under a general
anesthetic and use electrical shock to restore his heartbeat to its regular
rhythm . . . . Such a step would have required him to transfer power, albeit
very briefly, to Vice President Quayle, and Bush, alone in the night after
Barbara had returned to the White House after kissing her husband
goodbye, thought that his condition might be more serious than he had first
thought . . . .
His doctors had found that Bush was suffering from Graves’ disease, which
had also afflicted Barbara since 1989. “An overactive thyroid,” wrote New
York Times medical correspondent Lawrence K. Altman, “can cause
symptoms like nervousness, restlessness, hyperactivity and weight loss.”
He would have to forgo alcohol for a time . . . .
Bush’s overactive thyroid had led to his excessively rapid heart rate (the
atrial fibrillation). Now that the doctors had handled the fibrillation through
medication . . . the question turned to treating his Graves’ disease . . . .
Bush’s doctors introduced medication . . . [but] “[i]t was a difficult
balancing act,” recalled [a] White House physician . . . If we did not have
the medication exactly right, then he . . . would have less energy and less
focus than he had in the first part of his presidency . . . . “To those of us
who watched him carefully, the old zip was gone,” recalled Marlin
Fitzwater.212
IX. DONALD J. TRUMP
But whatever emerges from Robert Mueller’s investigation, it should not
obscure the bigger story, which is still not adequately understood . . .
namely that Russia has been actively seeking to damage the fabric of
American democracy, and the Trump Administration’s glandular aversion
to even looking at this squarely, much less mounting a concerted response
to it, is an appalling national security lapse.
Michael V. Hayden
Former Director,
National Security Agency (NSA)
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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)213
On Saturday morning September 22, 2018, readers of The New York Times awoke
to read a page one story about how the deputy attorney general, Rod J. Rosenstein had
previously advocated the secret White House recording of President Trump, “to
expose the chaos consuming the administration, and he discussed recruiting cabinet
members to invoke the 25th Amendment to remove Mr. Trump from office for being
unfit.”214
A. Concern at the Highest Levels of Government
The Times story had been widely reported the afternoon before, placing
Rosenstein’s spring 2017 suggestion after President Trump’s firing of F.B.I. director
James B. Comey and having “plunged the White House into turmoil. Over the ensuing
days, the president divulged classified intelligence to Russians in the Oval Office, and
revelations emerged that Mr. Trump had asked Mr. Comey to pledge loyalty and end
an investigation into a senior aide.”215 The New York Times story continues:
Mr. Rosenstein was just two weeks into his job. He had begun overseeing
the Russia investigation and played a key role in the president’s dismissal
of Mr. Comey by writing a memo critical of his handling of the Hillary
Clinton email investigation. But Mr. Rosenstein was caught off guard when
Mr. Trump cited the memo in the firing, and he began telling people that
he feared he had been used.
Mr. Rosenstein made the remarks about secretly recording Mr. Trump and
about the 25th Amendment in meetings and conversations with other
Justice Department and F.B.I. officials. Several people described the
episodes in interviews over the past several months, insisting on anonymity
to discuss internal deliberations. The people were briefed either on the
events themselves or on memos written by F.B.I. officials, including
Andrew G. McCabe, then the acting bureau director, that documented Mr.
Rosenstein’s actions and comments . . . .
The extreme suggestions show Mr. Rosenstein’s state of mind in the
disorienting days that followed Mr. Comey’s dismissal. Sitting in on Mr.
Trump’s interviews with prospective F.B.I. directors and facing attacks for
his own role in Mr. Comey’s firing, Mr. Rosenstein had an up-close view
of the tumult. Mr. Rosenstein appeared conflicted, regretful and emotional,
according to people who spoke with him at the time. 216
The Rod Rosenstein story seemed to fuel added focus toward President Trump’s
lack of mental stability. For example, journalist Peter Baker writes, “[b]ut what has
213
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become increasingly clear in recent days is that the talk has extended not just to those
who never supported Mr. Trump, but even to some of those who worked for him.”217
Indeed, “the very discussion of it [Twenty-Fifth Amendment] within the
administration underscores just how volatile this presidency is and how fractured the
team around Mr. Trump is.”218 By late September 2018, reports of President Trump’s
mental instability had become legion. Bob Woodward mentions a senior White House
official describing of President Trump’s behavior, “[i]t seems clear that many of the
president’s senior advisors, especially those in the national security realm, are
extremely concerned with his erratic nature, his relative ignorance, his inability to
learn, as well as what they consider his dangerous views.”219 Woodward has also
reported that “Politico had run a long piece on Trump’s anger issues, calling Trump
‘driven by his temper’ and saying ‘anger serves as a way to manage staff, express his
displeasure or simply as an outlet that soothes him.’”220 The Arizona Republic reports
on May 30, 2017, that Arizona Republican U.S. Senator John McCain while:
In Australia for talks on security in the Asia-Pacific region, McCain urged
Australia to not give up on its alliance with the United States over jitters
about Trump. “I realize that some of President Trump’s actions and
statements have unsettled America’s friends,” McCain said. “They have
unsettled many Americans as well.” That referred to a testy phone call
between the newly installed Trump and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm
Turnbull, which allegedly ended with Trump hanging up on Turnbull.
McCain later helped to smooth over the incident.221
As early as August 2017, Republican U.S. Senator Bob Corker, addressing a
Rotary Club meeting in Chattanooga, Tennessee stated, “[t]he president has not yet
been able to demonstrate the stability, nor some of the competence, that he needs to
demonstrate in order for him to be successful—and our nation and our world needs
for him to be successful, whether you are Republican or Democrat.”222
Harvard law graduate, former Rhodes Scholar, and White House staff secretary
Rob Porter is credited with saying, “[a] third of my job was trying to react to some of
the really dangerous ideas that he had and try to give him reasons to believe that maybe
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they weren’t such good ideas.”223 By May 9, 2018 The Washington Post’s FactChecker blog is reported to have documented more than “3,000 false or misleading
statements in 466 days in office” by the president.224 As more fully developed
elsewhere:
On June 25, 2017 The New York Times states, “we believe his [Trump’s] long
pattern of using untruths to serve his purposes, as a businessman and as a politician,
means that his statements are not simply careless errors.”225 The New York Times
continues, “[w]e are using the word ‘lie’ deliberately. Not every falsehood is deliberate
on Trump’s part. But it would be the height of naïveté to imagine he is merely making
honest mistakes. He is lying.”226 Why is it important that The Los Angeles Times
warns that President Trump:
[I]s dangerous. His choice of falsehoods and his method of spewing them .
. . as if he spent his days and nights glued to his bedside radio and was
periodically set off by some drivel uttered by a talk show host . . . are a clue
to Trump’s thought processes and perhaps his lack of agency . . . .
He has made himself the stooge, the mark, for every crazy blogger, political
quack, racial theorist, foreign leader or nutcase peddling a story that he
might repackage to his benefit as a tweet, an appointment, an executive
order or a policy. He is a stranger to the concept of verification, the
insistence on evidence and the standards of proof that apply in a courtroom
or medical lab—that ought to prevail in the White House. 227
Former Exxon Chief Executive Officer and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is
famously reported to have described president Trump as a “moron.”228 Unfortunately,
many other less-than-flattering assessments have been made regarding President
Trump.229 Perhaps President Trump is simply incapable of processing or has no
interest in new ideas, as shown in Bob Woodward’s comment about those issues where
he had formed “decades of opinions, arguments were pointless. One of the most
experienced West Wingers in 2017 and 2018 said, ‘there’s some things where he’s
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already reached the conclusion and it doesn’t matter what you say. It doesn’t matter
what arguments you offer. He’s not listening.”230
B. The World Has Changed
It has been almost a century since Woodrow Wilson held the presidency while
wife Edith for seventeen months filtered all information presented to the president and
made decisions as to what should go to him for signature. The world has changed
dramatically. Rapid technological advances have resulted in the time line for global
warfare being reduced from months of necessary preparation during the time of
Woodrow Wilson (1919) to just minutes or seconds for deployment of deadly,
civilization ending weapons today. 231 Cyber threats are a daily reality and just as our
personal communications and household control devices are vulnerable, so too are
national security communications and control functions. 232 As The Commission
observed in 1988, “[w]e must be better prepared to cope with the frailties of man in
this nuclear age. The national interest demands it; the 25th Amendment can help.”233
C. Duty to Warn
A large and growing body of literature from many psychiatrists and other highly
regarded mental health experts warn of a clear and present concern about the mental
fitness of our current president, Donald Trump. 234 While an exhaustive treatment is
230

See WOODWARD, supra note 219, at 232.
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See Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack the Next Pearl Harbor?, 18 N.C. J. L. & TECH.
232 (2016).
232 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing Cyberthreat, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.
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Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1231 (2017); Lawrence J. Trautman,
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WARFARE 147 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Industrial Cyber
Vulnerabilities: Lessons from Stuxnet and the Internet of Things, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761
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& Steven Buser eds., 2017) [hereinafter NARCISSISM]; Jean Shinoda Bolen, The Wounded
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beyond the scope of this Article, enough coverage is presented to adequately make the
case and point interested readers to much more information. In Tarasoff v. Regents of
California, we find the landmark case establishing a duty of reasonable case upon
mental health care professionals requiring that they provide third parties, or likely
victims, of their dangerous patients with a warning of such danger. 235 The “duty to
warn” holding in Tarasoff has generated considerable discussion recently among
mental health professionals because of the conflicting guidance provided between
Tarasoff and the “Goldwater Rule.”
Bandy X. Lee, M.D., M. Div., is Assistant Clinical Professor in Law and
Psychology at Yale School of Medicine. 236 She also teaches at Yale Law School,
cofounded Yale’s Violence and Health Study Group, author of more than one hundred
peer-reviewed articles, and author or editor of numerous academic books. 237 Professor
Lee explains:

Issue Is Dangerousness, Not Mental Illness, in DANGEROUS CASE, supra note 234, at 170;
Leonard L. Glass, Should Psychiatrists Refrain from Commenting on Trump’s Psychology?, in
DANGEROUS CASE, supra note 234, at 151; Henry J. Friedman, On Seeing What You See and
Saying What You Know: A Psychiatrist’s Responsibility, in DANGEROUS CASE, supra note 234,
at 160; Judith Lewis Herman, Professionals and Politics, in DANGEROUS CASE, supra note 234,
at 1; Luba Kessler, Birtherism and the Deployment of the Trumpian Mind-Set, in DANGEROUS
CASE, supra note 234, at 261; Bandy X. Lee, Our Duty to Warn, in DANGEROUS CASE, supra
note 234, at 11; Robert Jay Lifton, Our Witness to Malignant Normality, in DANGEROUS CASE,
supra note 234, at xv; Kathryn Madden, The Hall of Mirrors: Narcissism and Celebrity in the
World of Twitter and Reality TV, in NARCISSISM, supra note 234, at 145; David M. Reiss,
Cognitive Impairment, Dementia, and POTUS, in DANGEROUS CASE, supra note 234, at 126;
Tom Singer, President Trump and the American Selfie: Archetypal Defenses of the Group
Spirit, in NARCISSISM, supra note 234, at 17; Steve Wruble, Trump’s Daddy Issues: A Toxic Mix
for America, in DANGEROUS CASE, supra note 234, at 268.
235 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976); see also Paul S.
Appelbaum, Tarasoff and the Clinician: Problems in Fulfilling the Duty to Protect, 142 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 425 (1985); W. Jonathan Cardi, A Pluralistic Analysis of the Therapist/Physician
Duties to Warn Third Parties, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877 (2009); Ann Hubbard, The Future
of ‘The Duty to Protect’: Scientific and Legal Perspectives on Tarasoff’s Thirtieth Anniversary,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 429 (2006); Elisia M. Klinka, It’s Been a Privilege: Advising Patients of the
Tarasoff Duty & Its Legal Consequences for the Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 863 (2009); Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the ‘Dangerous’ Patient:
Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263 (1982); John
Monahan, Tarasoff at Thirty: How Developments in Science and Policy Shape the Common
Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 497 (2006); Douglas Mossman, Critique of Pure Risk Assessment or,
Kant Meets Tarasoff, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 523 (2006); Mark A. Rothstein, Tarasoff Duties After
Newtown, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 104 (2014); Christopher Slobogin, Tarasoff as a Duty to
Treat: Insights from Criminal Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 645 (2006); LEON VANDECREEK &
SAMUEL KNAPP, TARASOFF AND BEYOND: LEGAL AND CLINICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
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Norms and rules guide professional conduct, set standards, and point to the
essential principles of practice. For these reasons, physicians have the
Declaration of Geneva (World Medical Association 2006) and American
Medical Association Principles of Medical Ethics (2001), which guide the
American Psychiatric Association’s code for psychiatry (American
Psychiatric Association 2013). The former confirms the physician’s
dedication to the humanitarian goals of medicine, while the latter defines
honorable behavior for the physician. Paramount in both is the health,
safety, and survival of the patient.
Psychiatrists’ code of ethics derive directly from these principles. In
ordinary practice, the patient’s right to confidentiality is the bedrock of
mental health care dating back to the ethical standards of the Hippocratic
Oath. However, even this sacrosanct rule is not absolute. No doubt, the
physician’s responsibility is first and foremost to the patient, but it extends
“as well to society” (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p.2). It is part
of professional expectation that the psychiatrist assess the possibility that
the patient may harm himself or others. When the patient poses a danger,
psychiatrists are not merely allowed but mandated to report, to incapacitate,
and to take steps to protect.
If we are mindful of the dangers of politicizing the professions, then
certainly we must heed the so-called “Goldwater rule,” or Section 7.3. of
the APA code of ethics (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p.6),
which states: “it is unethical for a psychiatrist to offer a professional
opinion [on a public figure] unless he or she has conducted an examination
and has been granted proper authorization for such a statement.” This is not
divergent from ordinary norms of practice: the clinical approach that we
use to evaluate patients require a full examination. Formulating a credible
diagnosis will always be limited when applied to public figures observed
outside this intimate frame; in fact, we would go so far as to assert that it is
impossible.
The Goldwater rule highlights the boundaries of practice, helps to preserve
professional integrity, and protects public figures from defamation. It
safeguards the public’s perception of the field of psychiatry as credible and
trustworthy. It is reasonable to follow it. But even this respectable rule must
be balanced against the other rules and principles of professional practice.
A careful ethical evaluation might ask: Do our ordinary norms of practice
stop at the office of president? If so, why? If the ethics of our practice
stipulate that the health of our patient and the safety of the public be
paramount, then we should not leave our norms at the door when entering
the political sphere. Otherwise, a rule originally conceived to protect our
profession from scandal might itself become a source of scandal. For this
very reason, the “reaffirmation” of the Goldwater rule in a separate
statement by the American Psychiatric Association (2017) barely two
months into the new administration seems questionable to us . . . .
A psychiatrist who disregards the basic procedures of diagnosis and
treatment and acts without discretion deserves reprimand. However, the
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public trust is also violated if the profession fails in its duty to alert the
public when a person who holds the power of life and death over us all
shows signs of clear, dangerous mental impairment. We should pause if
professionals are asked to remain silent when they have seen enough
evidence to sound an alarm in every other situation . . . .
Assessing dangerousness is different from making a diagnosis: it is
dependent on the situation, not the person. Signs of likely dangerousness
due to mental disorder can become apparent without a full diagnostic
interview and can be detected from a distance, and one is expected to err,
if at all, on the side of safety when the risk of inaction is too great. 238
Writing in 2017, during just the first few months of the Trump Administration,
Professor Lee states concerns held by many mental health professionals:
It doesn’t take a psychiatrist to notice that our president is mentally
compromised. Members of the press have come up with their own
diagnostic nomenclature, calling the president a “mad king” (Dowd 2017),
a “nut job” (Collins 2017), and “emotionally unhinged” (Rubin 2017).
Conservative columnist George Will (2017) writes that the president has a
“disorderly mind.” By speaking out as mental health professionals, we lend
support and dignity to our fellow citizens who are justifiably alarmed by
the president's furious tirades, conspiracy fantasies, aversion to facts, and
attraction to violence . . . . When he lies, does he know he is lying, or does
he believe his own lies? When he makes wild accusations, is he truly
paranoid, or is he consciously and cunningly trying to deflect attention from
his misdeeds? . . . A man can be both evil and mentally compromised—
which is a more frightening proposition. Power not only corrupts but also
magnifies existing psychopathologies, even as it creates new ones. Fostered
by the flattery of underlings and the chants of crowds, a political leader’s
grandiosity may morph into grotesque delusions of grandeur. Sociopathic
traits may be amplified as the leader discovers that he can violate the norms
of civil society and even commit crimes with impunity. And the leader who
rules through fear, lies, and betrayal may become increasingly isolated and
paranoid, as the loyalty of even his closest confidents must forever be
suspect.239
Here is the author’s personal disclaimer. Having absolutely no training in medicine
or mental health, I am reluctant to devote too much ink to any diagnosis, long-distance
or otherwise, regarding the mental health status of any political actor. For purposes of
this Article, the relevant areas of my scholarship include: many years inquiry into
matters of law, governance, and international relations—all with a particular interest
in fostering the greater probability of world peace. However, the sheer volume of
scholarship from mental health professionals expressing serious concern about
President Trump’s mental stability is alarming. Before moving on, let us pause to
consider the following passages from mental health professionals Philip Zimbardo and
Rosemary Sword who state:
238
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Whether or not Donald Trump suffers from a neurological disorder—or
narcissistic personality disorder, or any other mental health issue, for that
matter—will, undeniably, remain conjecture unless he submits to tests,
which is highly unlikely given his personality. However, the lack of such
tests cannot erase the well-documented behaviors he has displayed for
decades and the dangers they pose when embodied in the president of the
United States.240
Clinical psychologist and Lecturer for Harvard Medical School Craig Malkin’s
experience include helping families, couples and individuals for more than twentyfive years.241 Discussing pathological narcissism, he states:
The diagnosis of a mental illness . . . is not by itself a judgment about
whether a person is a capable leader . . . .
What mental health experts concern themselves with most when it comes
to assessing the dangers of mental illness are “functional impairments.”
That is, how much do the symptoms of a person’s mental illness interfere
with their ability to hold down a job, maintain meaningful relationships,
and—most importantly—manage their intense feelings, such as anger or
sadness or fear, without becoming a danger to themselves or others? This
is particularly important when it comes to positions as powerful as
president of the United States. Steve Jobs calling another CEO “a piece of
shit” has far less troubling implications than the leader of the free world
telling a volatile dictator he’s “very dumb.”
...
The greatest danger, as we saw with Nixon, is that pathological narcissists
can lose touch with reality in subtle ways that become extremely dangerous
over time. When they can’t let go of their need to be admired or recognized,
they have to bend or invent a reality in which they remain special despite
all messages to the contrary. In point of fact, they become dangerously
psychotic. It’s just not always obvious until it’s too late . . . .
Pathological narcissists abhor admitting to vulnerability—feeling scared,
insecure, unsure of themselves—because they don’t trust people to support
them when they’re upset, a problem called insecure attachment in the
research . . . .
As pathological narcissists become increasingly thought-disordered, their
vision becomes clouded. That’s because if you see the world not as it is,
but as you wish or need it to be in order to preserve the belief you're special,
you lose touch with crucial information, brute facts, and harsh realities.242
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D. Loyalty to the Person of the Presidency or to the Nation?
Having had time to reflect on lessons to be gleaned from the assassination attempt
on President Reagan and to consider the needs of the nation in times of crisis involving
presidential disability, The National Commission on Presidential Disability and the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment concludes the following:
Not having a [rational and effective] leader during a national emergency or
world crisis would exacerbate the problem. Such considerations ought to
convince every responsible presidential aide that, whenever or however a
situation arises for applying the 25th Amendment, he or she must not
withhold information about the president’s health or otherwise discourage
using this constitutional remedy for a presidential illness. In addition, the
American people must understand that their presidents, whoever they may
be, are not superhuman. They are human beings subjected to enormous
pressures and responsibilities and, like the average citizen, they may face
disabling infirmities. The Commission believes that the 25th Amendment
provides the nation the means of insuring that the powers and duties of the
presidency are always in the hands of someone able to perform them. The
Commission believes that this Amendment must be utilized whenever
necessary as a normal ingredient in the governmental process. 243
E. Rosenstein Denial
The New York Times account of September 22, 2018 was disputed by Mr.
Rosenstein, stating “The New York Time’s story is inaccurate and factually
incorrect . . . . I will not further comment on a story based on anonymous sources that
are obviously biased against the department and are advancing their own personal
agenda.”244 Mr. Rosenstein continues, “[b]ut let me be clear about this: Based on my
personal dealings with the president, there is no basis to invoke the 25th
Amendment.”245
David Simon is author, journalist, writer, producer, and creator of such popular
television shows as: The Wire; The Deuce; and Treme.246 Mr. Simon provides one of
the most thoughtful and interesting observations I have seen thus far about the
Rosenstein-Twenty-Fifth Amendment story when he describes The New York Times
as having “foolishly made itself party to what amounts to a first-news-cycle
justification for an authoritarian to fire a torpedo into the very idea that we are a nation
of laws . . . . These are perilous times. Much is no longer normal in our governance.
The stakes are high.”247 Mr. Simon continues:
[W]e are a nation that is at the cusp of a profound Constitutional crisis. That
reality had already been made obvious and manifest when Mr. Comey was
243
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fired and he informed others in DOJ that judicial independence was at issue
in his contacts with the new POTUS. In the wake of that firing, any and
every discussion that competent DOJ professionals had about the matter
would have engaged with the tactics, fears, frustrations, considerations,
pitfalls and risks of proceeding to operate ethically and independent of any
executive obstruction of judicial procedure. In short, if they WEREN’T
sitting in rooms, stressed, trying to chart their way around an ethical
minefield and still do their jobs, it reflects incompetence or, worse,
abdication.
Having covered federal law enforcement, I know this much: These are men
and women who occupy a unique ethical space in our governance, serving
as they do at the pleasure of the U.S. president, but maintaining their
fundamental oath and loyalty not to the president, but to the Constitution.
There is conflict and nuance baked into that reality in the best of
circumstances; the U.S. President overtly demanding loyalty and the
intervention in DOJ casework by the FBI director, then firing the man is
scarcely the best of circumstances. For DOJ professionals attempting to
continue in their positions after such an event, talking it all out and
contemplating every option, risk and scenario is elemental to the job . . . .
The Times is essential in this historical moment. It needs to be smarter. And
more deliberate. And careful. And its best editors need to reflect on their
role with some greater measure of self-awareness. Or—and I don’t think I
am being hyperbolic at this point—they may help us lose our republic.248
F. Mental Health and the Presidency
And now for a truly difficult conundrum—what about the objectively verifiable
mental health of our nation’s top leaders? Is having a minimum standard for
presidential mental health an overly rational objective? Is passing a required mental
health examination as a condition to holding office by our top political leaders simply
unattainable? As The Washington Post reported in 1972, “Democratic nominee
George S. McGovern’s presidential hopes virtually evaporated when it was revealed
shortly after the party convention that his newly chosen vice presidential running mate,
Missouri U.S. Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton, had been hospitalized on three occasions for
depression and had undergone electroshock therapy.”249
Would such a mental health examination requirement serve as a deterrent resulting
in a candidate or elected official not seeking professional help when needed? These
are difficult issues that should be addressed. As historian Jonathan Zimmerman has
observed about President Trump:
Perhaps the post-Comey investigations will show that Trump colluded with
Russia, which could be cause for impeachment. But incapacity is
something else altogether. Do we really want to set a precedent where we
remove presidents for their infirmities, however ill-defined? Where will
that end?
248
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President Trump has run roughshod over some of America’s most
cherished civic norms and traditions. Now his enemies are doing the same
thing, by invoking an amendment for purposes that its authors expressly
renounced.
Go ahead and impeach the guy, if he has done something to deserve that.
But stop trying to pretend he’s incapable, when what you really mean is
he’s despicable. The entire future of the presidency could hinge on the
difference.250
X. CONCLUSION
The number of times an American president has been unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office is disturbing. Politicians are known throughout history
to have understated health problems or kept them secret. A brief history of known
instances where this diminished capacity has been shielded from the American public
is truly frightening. Is it time for a reasonable society to insist upon a favorable report
from a bipartisan commission of highly regarded physicians and mental health
professionals as a minimal requirement from candidates seeking the nation’s highest
offices? In an age when technology has enabled the destruction of the Earth and
elimination of all living beings within a matter of minutes, the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment may prove the last best hope for peace.

Jonathan Zimmerman, 25th Amendment Won’t Cut It to Remove Trump, S.F. CHRON.
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XI. APPENDICES
A. Appendix A: Statutory Succession Laws
The Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
Act of July 18, 1947
(a) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure
to qualify, there is neither a president nor vice president to discharge the powers and
duties of the office of president, then the speaker of the House of Representatives shall,
upon his resignation as speaker and as representative in Congress, act as president.
(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of the death, resignation, removal from
office, or inability of an individual acting as president under this subsection.
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a speaker is to begin
the discharge of the powers and duties of the office of president, there is no speaker,
or the speaker fails to qualify as acting president, then the president pro tempore of
the Senate shall, upon his resignation as president pro tempore and as senator, act as
president.
(c) An individual acting as president under subsection (a) or subsection (b) of this
section shall continue to act until the expiration of the then current presidential term,
except
(1) If his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in whole or in
part on the failure of both the president-elect and the vice president-elect to qualify,
then he shall act only until a president or vice president qualifies; and
(2) If his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in whole or in
part on the inability of the president or vice-president, then he shall act only until the
removal of the disability of one of such individuals.
(d) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure
to qualify, there is no president pro tempore to act as president under subsection (b) of
this section, then the officer of the United States who is highest on the following list,
and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of
president shall act as president: secretary of state, secretary of the treasury, secretary
of defense, attorney general, postmaster general, secretary of the interior, secretary of
agriculture, secretary of commerce, secretary of labor.*
(2) An individual acting as president under this subsection shall continue so to do
until the expiration of the then current presidential term, but not after a qualified and
prior-entitled individual is able to act, except that the removal of the disability of an
individual higher on the list contained in paragraph (1) of this subsection or the ability
to qualify on the part of an individual higher on such list shall not terminate his service.
(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified in the list in
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held to constitute his resignation from the
office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as president.
(3) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such officers as
are eligible to the office of president under the Constitution. Subsection (d) of this
section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, prior to the time of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or
failure to qualify, of the president pro tempore, and only to officers not under
impeachment by the House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the
office of president devolve upon them.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss3/7

54

2019]

THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT

427

(F) During the period that any individual acts as president under this section, his
compensation shall be at the rate then provided by law in the case of the president.
Act of January 19, 1886
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That in case of removal, death, resignation, or
inability of both the president and vice president of the United States, the secretary of
state, or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then
the secretary of the treasury, or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death,
resignation, or inability, then the secretary of War, or if there by none, or in case of
his removal, death, resignation, or inability, then the attorney-general, or if there be
none, or in the case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability then the postmaster
general, or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death, resignation, or inability,
then the secretary of the navy, or if there be none, or in case of his removal, death
resignation, or inability, then the secretary of the interior, shall act as president until
the disability of the president or vice president is removed or a president shall be
elected: Provide, That whenever the powers and duties of the office of president of the
United States shall devolve upon any of the persons named herein, if Congress be not
then in session, or if it would not meet in accordance with law within twenty days
thereafter, it shall be the duty of the person upon whom said powers and duties shall
devolve to issue a proclamation convening Congress in extraordinary session, giving
twenty days' notice of the time of meeting.
Sec. 2. That the preceding section shall only be held to describe and apply to such
officers as shall have been appointed by the advice and consent of the Senate to the
offices therein named, and such as are eligible to the office of president under the
Constitution, and not under impeachment by the House of Representatives of the
United States at the time the powers and duties of the office shall devolve upon them
respectively.
Sec. 3. That sections one hundred and forty-six, one hundred and forty-seven, one
hundred and forty-eight, one hundred and forty-nine, and one hundred and fifty of the
Revised Statutes are hereby repealed.
Act of March 1, 1792
Sec. 9. And be it further enacted, That in case of removal, death, resignation or
inability both of the president and vice president of the United States, the president of
the Senate pro tempore, and in case there shall be no president of the Senate [pro
tempore], then the speaker of the House of Representatives, for the time being shall
act as president of the United States until the disability be removed or a president shall
be elected.
Sec. 10. And be it further enacted, That whenever the offices of president and vice
president shall both become vacant, the secretary of state shall forthwith cause a
notification thereof to be made to the executive of every state, and shall also cause the
same to be published in at least one of the newspapers printed in each state, specifying
that electors of the president of the United States shall be appointed or chosen in the
several states within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in December then
next ensuing: Provided, There shall be the space of two months between the date of
such notification and the said first Wednesday in December, but if there shall not be
the space of two months between the date of such notification and the first Wednesday
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in December; and if the term for which the president and vice president last in office
were elected shall not expire on the third day of March next ensuing, then the secretary
of state shall specify in the notification that the electors shall be appointed or chosen
within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in December in the year next
ensuing, within which time the electors shall accordingly be appointed or chosen, and
the electors shall meet and give their votes on the first Wednesday in December, and
the proceedings and duties of the said electors and others shall be pursuant to the
directions prescribed in this act.
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B. Appendix B: Statement Regarding Importance of the President’s Physician
The Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
In the 1981 Congressional Directory, the first issued during the Reagan
administration, the staff listing for the Executive Office of the President (that is, the
White House office) contained 55 names. It began with the counselor to the president,
the chief of staff, his deputy, a raft of varied assistants to the president, then deputy
assistants and special assistants. The last name on the list was the chief usher; the name
just before his—54th of 55—was that of the physician to the president, preceded by
the curator of White House artifacts.
This Commission has been shocked at the low rank and, sometimes, the seemingly
low esteem accorded to the physician—and not just in the current administration.
Dr. Ruge, Reagan’s first White House physician, told this Commission that
“despite its glamorous name, the office of the White House physician is somewhat
blue collar.”
But it is far easier to say the physician’s job should be upgraded than to suggest
how to do it. Among other eminent and knowledgeable figures in both medicine and
the structure and workings of the White House office, this Commission has talked with
Dr. William Lukash, who served Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter. It is
apparent that each president has his own habits in his relation with his physician and
that these have varied almost as greatly as have presidential foreign and domestic
policies.
This leads us to conclude, first of all, that the president’s physician must remain a
person of the president’s own choice, that he or she should not be subject to Senate
confirmation or to approval by any other body, medical or otherwise. The president
and his personal physician must have total mutual confidence and confidentiality, as
a symbiotic relationship. But each of them must also realize that the physician has a
dual obligation. As Dr. Lukash agreed, such physicians are “accepting a dual loyalty
to their own patients but also to the public.”
Further, it should be noted, the post of physician to the president has grown from
a onedoctor role to what Dr. Lukash called providing “health care for the fifteen
hundred constituents in the White House,” with a second medical office in the
adjoining Executive Office Building and “two assistant physicians to help with the
traveling” groups that go with a chief executive, including the Secret Service, the
press, the military, and those involved in communications.
Still, the 25th Amendment centers directly on the president and, under certain
circumstances, the vice president. This is the role being considered in this appendix.
All other medical functions are strictly secondary.
We must, and do, assume that any future presidential physician will not only be a
skilled professional, but be highly knowledgeable of both the medical and political
aspects of the 25th Amendment as well. He or she must consider that he or she, and
all those physicians who assist from time to time, are responsible not only for the care
of the chief executive but also for the “care of the country.”
To be an effective personal physician, the time-honored concept of patient-doctor
confidentiality must be maintained in broad terms. The physician must become
acquainted with the vice president and have unquestioned access to the president.
The Commission suggests that a possible “code of conduct” for the president’s
physician should include:
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a. From the beginning of his appointment, the physician must know the history,
medical and political implications, and use of the 25th Amendment.
b. He or she should abide by the views of the American Medical Association
Council on Medical Ethics regarding patient-doctor confidentiality and those instances
when it can be abridged in the national or community interest. The Commission
considered recommending a statute stating that the presidential physician had a
positive duty to communicate details concerning the president’s condition if it
jeopardized the national interest, but concluded that such a statute was not necessary
and probably would be self-defeating.
c. He or she should meet during the transition period with the president-elect
regarding the potential use of the 25th Amendment’s disability provisions. With the
president-elect, the vice president-elect, and those who will become the president's
chief of staff and legal counsel, the physician should undertake during the transition
to establish, if possible, a written protocol regarding the use of these provisions.
d. He or she should possess the knowledge, humility, and expertise to obtain
consultation to insure the best medical care for the president. Any presidential
physician, if only because of his office, has easy access to any consultant or group of
consultants that he wishes to have seen the president to aid in treatment or to make the
difficult decision of evaluating disability (the latter being the key issue to invoke or
not invoke Section 4).
In order to reinforce the presidential physician’s influence whenever the 25th
Amendment might come into play, numerous persons have suggested in various
studies that an independent board of physicians be created to examine the president’s
physical and mental health from time to time. The Commission and the medical
advisory group to the Commission discussed this concept. The general conclusion was
that, while such a board would officially “protect” the president’s physician, it would
prevent or hinder a real doctor-patient relationship between the president and his or
her physician.
The political and world situation, the power of the White House staff and, most of
all, the president’s wishes will always determine when and how Section 3 will be used.
We urge that, because of his or her unique status, the president’s physician, with
consultants if he or she desires, play a major role. The physician should help the
president make the decision to invoke Section 3 and to reassume office if the
Amendment is used.
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